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INTRODUCTION 
. From April through September of 
1953, over 3,700 Americans were re-
leased to U.S. control from the pris-
oner-of-war camps in North Korea. 
Today several hundred Americans are 
estimated to he held prisoner in North 
Vietnam and in the jungle strongholds 
of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. 
As will be demonstrated, the fate of 
these prisoners will depend, as did 
the fate of those in Korea, on the out-
come of negotiations. 
The United States lIJust be prepan-d 
fllr thl's(' nl'~otiations. It ~hould Ilot 
again allow talks to dra~ on for 2 
years, serving COlllmunist purpos('~, 
\\ hile ca~lIalti('s arc hein~ suffered on 
the halllcfield, and mcn c()ntinu(! to 
languish in prisoner-of-war camps. We 
must learn from the experience of 
Korea. lL is hoped that this papcr will 
contribute to that learning. Its pur-
pose is simply to draw upon our ex-
perience in both negotiating for the 
repatriation of prisoners of war ancl 
in administering prisoners of war in 
Korea. Lessons wiII be sought that 
have application to negotiations over 
prisoners of war in Vietnam. 
To ~atisf)' this purpose requires, 
first. a hrit'f (,oll1pari~nJl of the pnlitical 
arlll military situatioJl ill 1\.111"(-:\ ill 
1951-5:~ with that in Vietnam ill )%B 
ill order to appreciate the similarities 
and dilTen'nces of Ihe Iwo l'ellin~s. 
Our purpose Ihen ill\·olves the accom-
plishment of Ihree lasks. The first is 
to make a detailed study of Ihe Korean 
prisoner-of-war negotiations with Ihe 
object of isolating mistakes that were 
made and delermining whether the 
agreement finally reached will have an 
impact on Vietnam negotiations. The 
second is an examination of the cur-
rent prisoner-oC-war situation on bOlh 
sides in Vietnam and its possible in-
fluence on negotiations. The third and 
final task is to recommend procedures 
and courses of action that, if astutely 
implemented, will assist our negotia-
tors in insuring the early ~epatriation 
of American prisoners of war. 
I - KOREA AND VIETNAM: 
A COMPARISON 
Thc RC(IUiremcnt for Ncgotia-
tions in Vietnam. On 27 July 1953 
the commander of the United Nations 
Command in Korea, l the commander 
of tl\(' [Norlh] Korean People's Army, 
and Ihe commander of the Chinese 
People's Volunteer Army signed Ihe 
mililary armistice bringing a cease-fire 
to Ihe Korean war. This cloGumcnt 
was Ihe rl'5ull of 2 p'ars of n("~olia­
tions between representatives of the 
commanders on each side. It ended 
the first conflict since 1812 in which 
the mililary situation did not allow 
the United States either to force con-
cessions or dictate terms. The last 1·1-
months of the negotiations were ("011-
cm·ned wilh the only unresolved issue 
between the two parties: the repatria-
tion of prisoners of war. 
At this writing, just short of 15 
years after the signing of the Korean 
armislice, U.S. forces are again locked 
in comhal wilh a c'olllnlllllist 1'1\(,1ll)" 
on an Asian peninsula. On(·e a~aill 
the misforlunes of war have resuilrc! 
in Ihe caplure anc! confinelllent in Com-
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nlllnil't prisons (If j\ lIwriean soldi('rs, 
sailors, and airmen. As in Korea, the 
Unilcd Stales has chosen to limit its 
application of military power. F ur-
ther, it proposes to bring an end to 
the fighting. through negotiations. 
There is no assurance that negotia-
tions will be the method through which 
the fighting in Vietnam is brought to 
a close. Combat could quite logically 
gradually decrease in intensity, as did 
the guerrilla war in Greece in 19-1-8, 
until the war is simply no longer being 
fought.:! But Ihe United States has a 
solemn obligation to its captured per-
sonnel. Their repatriation can only 
be accomplished through negotiation 
with those that hold them. The alter-
native to negotiating their release is 
to abandon them. 
It does not follow, of course, that 
these negotiations will necessarily be 
of the same format and protocol as 
those in Korea. Possible forms of these 
negotiations range from a full-blown 
international conference, where the ex-
change of prisoners of war is but one 
agenda ilem, to quiet dialog in a 
neulral country, or mere clandestine 
meetings in a jungle clearing. They 
could also be conducted by third par-
lies rcprescnlinp; onc or bOlh sides. 
Bill IdJaI("vI~r form III(' 1II·~oliali()IIS 
lake, they wiH be a reflcction of,the polit-
ical and military situation in Vietnam 
at the time. Accordingly, the applica-
tion of the Korean negotiating experi-
ence to Vietnam depends upon the com-
parability of the two settings. 
Similarities. Both conflicts 
stemmed from a confrontation between 
Communist expansion into the periph-
ery of Asia and the U.S. determination 
to contain that expansion. Both re-
yolve around a single nalion which 
jwcall\(' Iwo slales dil'idl,t! hy a lilH', 
lIlt' :lBlh paralld ill Kon'a, Ilw 171h ill 
Vielnam, which oslensibly was 10 haye 
been temporary. In e;ch case Ihe 
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ComllluJlist-<:oJltrollcd Jlorth_ honh'riJl~ 
on Communist China, attempted to 
seize the southern portion through the 
use of force. In Korea the seizure was 
attempted through invasion hy con-
ventional forces supported to a de-
gree hy a guerrilla force, in Vietnam 
through armed insurgency and guer-
rilla warfare supported to a degree by 
com'entional military formations infil-
trated into the south. Communist ob-
jectives were identical in hoth in-
stances: to unify the nation hy force 
under a Communist regime. 
In each case the U.S.-supported 
forces in the south pro\-ed to be inade-
quate to the task of defense. Ameri-
can armed forces were intr<~d.!lced at 
the last moment, just in time to save 
Pusan in 1950, just in time to save 
Saigon in 1965. The American mili-
tary commitment took similar forms; 
piecemeal introduction of ground 
forces to secure critical areas in the 
south, coupled with an air campai~n 
against the 'north, with all military 
action heing limited to the geographical 
area of the contested nation. Limited 
as the commitment was in each case, 
military initiative ultimately passed to 
the U.S. forces. Intervention occurred 
at just that time when the Communists 
must IUH'e begun to think of yie!ory 
parades. 
The Communist reaction to Ameri-
can intervention was similar in both 
events. To salvage the situation in 
Korea, major formations of the Chinese 
Communist Army were committed. In 
an attempt to regain the initiative in 
Vietnam, major formations of the 
North Vietnamese Army entered the 
struggle. Communist military suc-
cesses, at first relatively cheap, had 
been made extremely expensive. Pros-
peets of a('hie\'ing their ohjeetin' 
throu~h military action dimllled. Vi,·-
tl)ry. OIH"l' appearing hut Illonths pr 
weeks away, receded into the future, 
if possible at all. 
While stall'nlatl' does not ,w('uralt,l) 
describe either the situation in Korea 
at the time armistice negotiatioJls he· 
gan or the situation in Vietnam toda) , 
the two situations can be depicted as 
ones in which victory in a military 
sense cannot be quickly achieved by 
either side with the force levels de-
ployed. In Korea a realistic estimate 
of the military situation led the Com-
munists to propose truce talks - a pro-
posal accepted eagerly by the United 
States. In Vietnam the Communist 
estimate has not yet led them to a 
similar conclusion. 
In the meantime, hattles in Vietnam 
have resulted in over 6,000 Commu-
nists being interned in prisoner-of-war 
camps in the south:! as were 169,000 
Comll1unists at the time of the Korean 
negotiations.4 As of August 1967 there 
were approximately 650 American 
military personnel who were classified 
as either missing or as prisoners of 
war in North'and South Vietnam. The 
Unitefl States believed that :;ome 200 
of these men were being held as pris-
oners of war. Also held as prisoners 
of war were an unknown number of 
_soldiers of the Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (ARVN).r. This compares 
to ;~,746 American, 8,:'.21 personn('1 of 
the Ht'Jluhlic of Korl'a A nlly (HOKA). 
and 1,377 personnel from other na-
tional contingents of the United Nations 
Commallfl who were held in North 
Korea.r. While the weight of prisoners 
on both sides is smaller, a larger num-
ber is again held hy the side allied with 
the United Slates. 
The U.S. Government cannot turn 
its hack on the Americans in enemy 
hands. It is ohlil!ated by the funda-
mental heliefs underlying the American 
political system to do all it can to 
obtain th(, release of its citizt'n!'. Till' 
Coil" of Contluct pronllllgall'tl in I (I;';' 
for Ihl' guitlance of U.S. l;l'r\"i('('1l1l'1l 
made e\-cn more explicit this ohli~atioJ\ 
of the U.S. Go\'ernment.; 
The code formally illlpO~CS ohli~a­
tions on the individual members of the 
Armed Forces of the United States, 
but it is the last sentence of the last 
article which is pertinent to this paper_. 
It reads, "I will trust in my God and 
the United States of America." The 
Department of Defense has stated in 
its training instructions, 
Ju~t as you ha\"l' a Tc!'pon!'ihility 10 
your country under the Code of Con-
duct, the Unitl'd Slatcs Govcrnnwnl hag 
a matchin~ rr!'pou~ihilily - alway~ In 
!'Iand hrhind c\'cry Amcrican fi~hlin~ 
man. An individual unfol'luna\(' ('Il<lll/!h 
to become a prisoner of war will not 
be forgollcn by his Govcrnmcnt , , _ 
his Government will use every practical 
means to establish conlact wilh and 
support our prisoners of war, and In 
gain their release," 
American negotiators in Vietnam, 
therefore, will1e subject to limitations 
and pressures, as were their predeces-
sors in Korea, that Communist negotia-
tors do noL experience. 
Diffcl·eIlCCS. While the situations 
in Vietnam and in Korea hm'e ~triking 
similarities, they are not carbon copies. 
In 1951-53 the Communist forces could 
be treated as the instrument of a mono-
lithic hloe led by Moscow. In Vietnam 
in 1968 this situation no longer holds. 
The Sino-Soviet split places ~Hanoi in 
a middle position between the two 
Communist giants - a position which 
provides some freedom of maneuver 
and independence but which is never-
theless precarious. In order to retain 
the support of hoth, Hanoi must some-
how reconcile the divergent desires of 
each. The statements of Kosygin and 
Chou in 1968 do not carry the same 
authoriLY regarding the VieLnam war 
as did the statement~ of Stalin and 
Chou of 1 0;'2 rt'~arding thc Kon'an 
war. It wOIlI,1 IH' 1II1\"1'ali~ti,' toda\' til 
rely upon thl' COlllllluni~t:; llIakin~ ;'on-
c('ssions in Asia in unlt'r to inll!II'Ill'I' 
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c\'ents in Europe or e1~ewhcre on the 
international scene. J L would be equally 
unrealistic to ~ely on American adions 
outside of Asia innuencing events in 
Vietnam. The leverage of hoth the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. is there-
fore considerably reduced in Vietnam 
as compared to Korea. 
As in Korea, the Communists in 
Vietnam find it advantageous to cam-
ounage the identity of their partici-
pants in the fighting. In the Korean 
ca~e the Comlllunists profcsscd that 
North Korea was their only bclligercnt, 
maintaining the fietion that the "Chi-
nese People's Volunteer Army" was 
only assisting it. In Vietnam the. cam-
ounage is even denser, the Communists 
insisting that the only belligerent is 
the so-called National Liberation Front 
in South Vietnam. The Hanoi Govern-
ment doesn't admit that regular units 
of the North Vietnamese Army partici-
pate in the fighting in South Vietnam. 
NegotiaLions for a military cease-fire 
in Korea were conducted with Lwo rep-
resentatives, one from the North Korean 
Army. one from the Chinese Army. In 
Vietnam, a::::::ullling that the North Viet-
namese continue to maintain the fic-
tion of their nonparticipation, they 
may insist that llI!~ot iations conc:erning 
a c:ease-firl' ill SOllth Vietnam II(' COIl-
ducted with representatives of the Na-
tional Liberation Front even though 
it is North Vietnam that holds the ma-
jority of American prisoners. 
On the U.S. and allied side, the 
command relationships between U.S. 
forces and indigenous forces are not 
the same as they were in Korea. In 
Korea all forces. including those of 
South Korea, were under the opera-
tional control of the United Nations 
Command; in Vietnam such an ar-
ran~ellll'IIL doC's not exisl. Gen. William 
r.. \V,'stlllll rl'la 1111. t h,' n.s. COlllma IIdl'!' 
ill Vil'lllam. del(':; not ,')(('r('i:;(' ('0111-
mand oyer the Hl'pllhlie of Vil,tnalll 
Arml'd For('e:; (RVNAF), 1101', inlleell, 
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thm<e U.S. forcrs lH'ill~ employed ill 
the air campaign against North Viet-
nam.!) Suhordinate U.S. commanders 
do not command Vietnamese Army 
(ARVN) units as did the Eighth U.S. 
Army Commander over South Korean 
upits. Lacking a single military com-
mand, it is unlikely that one senior 
delegate to an armistice conference 
could he empowered to represent all 
anti·Communist forces as did Adm. C. 
Turner Joy and later Gen. William K. 
Harrison in Korea. 
Summary. In our comparison of 
Vietnam with Korea, we have detcr-
mined that in each case the Communist 
ohjective has heen the same: to unify 
by force a divided nation into a Com-
munist· state .. \Ve have seen that the 
intervention of U.S. armed force in 
each case frustrated the Communist 
purpose and .that"' a military situation 
resulted in which neither side was able 
(or willing) to achie\'e military su-
periority that would allow dictatill~ 
the terms of an armistice. Prisoners 
of war haye been generated hy the 
fighting, the large majority again being 
held by the anti-Communist forces. In 
Korea the military situation led to 
truce talks during which the repatria-
tion of prisoners of war was negot iatrd. 
In Vietnam the military situation has 
not. yet led to truce talks, and there is 
no assurance that it will. The repatria· 
tion of prisoners of war must, neverthe· 
less, be negotiated if the United States 
is to meet its commitment to its per-
sonnel as expressed in the Code of 
Conduct. Because of the fiction of non-
participation hy North Vietnam in the 
southern battles, it appears at this time 
that separate negotiations may well 
haye to be held with the Hanoi regime 
and with the National Liheration Front. 
Difiiculties coultl also Ilt' cncounterrll 
on til!' l:nilt'd Statl's-Hl'!lublil' of Yit'!· 
nam sidl' dul' to tl1l' lack of a sin1!lt' 
unified command. With these similari-
tit's alld differences Il('t wcell tIll' t WIl 
situations in mind, \1 c will turn to our 
study of the Korean negotiations. 
II - KOREA: TIlE INITIAL 
NEGOTIATIONS 
The Korean armistice was signed 3 
years and 1 month after the outbreak 
of hostilities; but during 2 of those 3 
years negotiations with the enemy 
were being conducted to terminate the 
lighting. The most difficult issue to 
resolve stemmed from fundamental dis-
agreement on whether a prisoner of 
war had a choice to be repatriated. The 
United Nations Command (UNC) main-
tained that he did have a choice, and 
it would return no prisoner of war who 
indicated he would resist repatriation. 
The Communist side held that all pris-
oners of war must be repatriated re-
gardless of their desires. The UNC 
stayed with its position until the end. 
The Communists eventually made the 
necessary concessions that allowed the 
armistice to be concluded. 
To facilitate discussion, the 2-year 
negotiations will be separated into /lYe 
phases as they pertained to the pris-
oner of war issue: 
Phase I (July-December 1951): The 
prediscm;~ion pha~e. Prisoncrs of war 
included as an agenda item, but no 
negotiations on the issue are conducted. 
Phase II (Decem»er 1951-April 
1952'): Initial negotiations. Opposing 
positions are reached on repatriation. 
Agreement to poll prisoners on their 
desire. 
Phase III (April 1952-0ctober 
1952): Deadlock. Results on poll are 
announced. Repatriation becomes sole 
unresolved issue. Attempts at compro· 
mi~c fail. 
Phal'r IV ! Ol'loll('1' 1 %2-Fl'llI'IJary 
JI>:l:n: CI'llt'ral :\:<sl'lllhl~ dl,hah',;. 
Negotiations in rt'l'l':;S. Gl'lwl'al A~· 
sembI), passes resolution sponsored br 
India. 
Phase V ( February-J uly ] 95:{ ) : 
Agreement reached_ Sick and wounded 
prisoners exchan~ed. Armistice agree-
menL si~ned. 
Each of Lhe above phases will be dis-
cussed in turn, with emphasis on Lhe 
reasoning behind the actions taken by 
each side. 
Determining the UNC Position. 
The UNC position, iniLially termcd 
"voluntary repatrialion," was in full 
accord with Western liheral Lenets hold-
ing that each man has a voice in his 
own destin)". It was not a position 
that was assumed automatically by the 
U.S. Go\·ernment. IL was taken some-
whaL reluctantly. The initial insLruc-
tions to Gcneral Ridgeway on the pris-
oner-of-war question were' in the 
contexL of confining the negotiati0l1s 
solely to military matters. The armis-
tice was to insure that the Communists 
did not profit militarily hy a cease-fire. 
The UNC negotiators were to insist on 
no reinforcement of troops except a 
one-for-one replacement and prisoners 
of war were to be exchanged like\\ ise 
on a one-for-one hasis. If agreement 
on these points could he obtained, no 
manpower increase on one side would 
result that was not to he enjoyed by 
the other.1 
Armistice negotiations hegan on 10 
July 1951. Both sides agreed without 
dispute to include as Item Four of the 
agenda, "Arrangements relating to 
prisoners of war." In late August the 
JCS informed General Ridgeway that 
he could de\'e1op for planning purposes 
a negotiating position based on volun-
tary repatriation.:! At the end of \Yorld 
War II U.S. leader~hip had been 
shocked at the reaction of former 50-
"iet and Eastern European personnel 
who hall to Ill' fOITl'd to n'turn tn tlu'ir 
Comllluni::t honll'lanlk TIH.'Y hall been 
e\'en mon' scwrely sllllrkcd by thl' 
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trl'atnll'nt theH~ relllrnl'Cs had n'("('i\'ed 
at the hands of thl' Communists.:! The 
hUlllanitarian aspect of the UNC posi-
tion therefore had greaL appeal.·1 
In NO\'emher, General Ridgeway 
suhmilled to Lhe JCS his plan on pris-
oner-of-war negotiations. lIe proposed 
to aUempt a one-for-one exchange. If 
the Communists agreed, the UNC could 
retain or release prisoners who did not 
wanL to relurn since it held man}' more 
prisoners than did the Communists. If 
the Communists insisted upon an alI-
for-all exchangl'_ Ridgeway was pre-
pared to agrce.:; The JCS approved 
thc.<;e proposals but suggested that 
Ridgeway try to geL Communist agree-
ments to a scheme wherehy a joint 
UNC-Comlllunist t('am would serc('n 
prisoners prior to their release. Those 
who indicaLed they did nol desire reo 
patriation would remain with their 
captor,:.'; When Rear Adm. Ruthven 
E. Lihhy entered negotiations on ] 1 
December ] 95] as head of the UNC 
subdelegation on Item Four, he did 
not haye a firm mandate. He was to 
~eek a!!rcement on a one·for-one ex-
rhan!!c' therehy insuring the prinl'iple 
of \'oluntary repatriation. He was not 
to insisl on such an exchange, how-
e\'er, to the jeopardy of the speedy re-
turn of Communist-held prisoners. 
Negotiations Begin. The first 
a;.!reemcnL hetween Admiral Lihhy and 
his Communist counterpart was to ex-
chan;.!e rosLers of the prisoners of war 
held hy each side. The Communists' 
rosters indicated they held only 7,142 
of the 88,000 South Korean soldiers 
carried as missing. They admitted to 
holding only 3.198 of the 7.1·12 U.S. 
persollnel listed as missing. 0 r the 
188.000 personnel li,:ted by the Com-
muni,:ts as mi,:sin~. the UNC could 
pro\'id(' th(' nam('s of 1 ( 1)_000 captiws. 
As had 11('1'11 fpan'd_ Ihl' COlllllllllli~ts 
ill"i"tt'd on an all· for-all ('xl"han!!l'. The 
Comnl\lIIi~l~ thl'rl'hy would he ~x-
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(·han;.dni! onl\- ~onlC I 0.000 pri~oner~ 
for o\'er 100.000. An equi\'alent of 
some 10 divisions would he added to 
tht' Communist for('e. Admiral T ,ihh~ 
objected to thi~ inequity and furthcr 1Ie-
cused the Communists of not reportin)!. 
all the pri~oners they held. 
In explaining the discrepancy he· 
tween the number of pri~oners the 
Communists had hoastcd as h:l\'ini! 
captured during the fightinp: and the 
numher on thc ro~ters they suhmilled 
to the UNC negotiators, the Commu-
nists claimed that the lists were small 
hecause, 
, •• Wl' allowed Iho~,' who wanl,·d III 
p:o ha('k hOllle and did not wanl to join 
a war ap:ain$t their Ilwn counlry (Kol'-
,'an5) 10 p:1l hal'k and liw a IlI'acdlll 
life at IlIInll', And we direell}, 1'I,!t'a,,('!1 
at Ihe front Ihu$\! for('ip:n Ilri~on('r$ (If 
war (non·Kor('an~) who did nol wanl 10 
join Ihe ,Val' 'al!ain~t IH'"pl(' ,din fip:ht 
fill' Iheir n-al indl'j1(,ll(l"nce, who lip:hl 
for th('ir own people, These mca5urC5 
of ours an' III·rf",·tl}' rip:hl •..• 
This claim \\ll~, in cs~en('e. a ~tatcl!lent 
[hat the Comllluni!:"ts had allowed their 
('apt in's a choice. They had aln'ad~ 
pral'ticed \'oluntar), rt'patriation. 
The UNC presented its first substan-
ti\'e proposal on prisoners of war on 2 
January. It was a crueial point in thc 
nei!otiations, hel'au~c it wa~ thi~ pro-
posal which Iirst ollieially linked the 
UNC to the concept of "voluntary re-
patriation." Admiral Libby stated that 
the UNC would accept the concept that 
had been practiced by the Commu-
nists_ It would relea~e prisoners who 
upon their release could exerci!:"e in-
di\'idual option as to \\hether to return 
to their 0\\ n army or join the c1lptur-
ing ~idl'. It was proposed that tIll' In-
t('rnational Hed Cros~ supen'ise the 
exerci~e of the choice. To alleviate any 
military ach'antage, Lihhy IJI'oposed 
that pri!'lln('r,; of \\ar in ('X('e~~ of a 
olll'-for-Olll' cx('han~e II(' paroled. not 
to fi:.rht a~ain a:.rain5t their l·aptor~. 
Similarly. those, \\ho )'('fll~ed )'('patria-
tion \\mdd not hl~ allO\\ecl to take up 
arllls a~ain~t the othcr side. The UNC 
had not only adopted "volunllll") rc-
patriation," it had at the ~allle time 
retreated from its original position of 
a pure one-for-one exchange, substitut-
ing therefore an unenforceable parole 
system.'! 
Negotiations on the 2' January pro· 
p[)~al cont inll('d for the next 3 months. 
During the C()lIr~e of these negotiations 
the UNC completely dropped the phrase 
"one-for-one" and "equal numbers" 
from the repatriation principles. The 
hasic demand of the UNC became "no 
forced repatriation" in lieu of "volun-
tary repatriation." The Communists, 
on their side, conceded that natives of 
South Korea held prisoner by the UNC 
might have an option, but that Chinese 
and North Korean prisoners must he 
returned.!I This was an apparent re-
treat from their previous "all-for-all" 
demand. 
A~I-C(,Jl1Cl1t to Poll PI'i!'lonc'I'!'I. 
On I April the lINC pl'llll()~ed that 
"tlll' rl'll'a~(' and l'l'p:ltriatilln (If ~lll'h 
prisoner~ of \\ al' ~hall Ill' ('ITI,(,tl'd (In 
the basis of li~ts whieh shall he dll~l'k('d 
by and shall be mutually acceptable lCI 
hoth sides prior to the signing of the 
Arllli~ti!:e Agn',mH'III." Thl' liNe 
added two understandings, ho\\'e\'er, 
which clearly held there would he 1111 
forced repatriation stating that, "tho~r 
who could not be repatriated without 
the application of force shall be re· 
leased by the detaining power and 
resettled ... in a location of their own 
choosing .... " 10 
In discussi!l,!! thi~ proposal the COlli' 
Illuni~ts in~istl'd on brin~ flll'llishrd a 
round figure on the numbers of Jlri~IlII' 
ers the UNC might return to the COlli' 
l11uni~t side. They were told 116,000, 
a fii!uJ'(' admill(,llIy ha:·wd on ~t)(':;:;\\'()rk 
hilt a :;in(,l't'(' e~tilllat" that the Far Ea~t 
COlllllland had furnished the Depart. 
ment IIf tl\l' Arlll)" in III id-Fl'1!1'IIary_ 
To obtain more accurate information 
it was a~reed that the prisoners would 
have to he polled_ Once a~ain, the 
Communists appeared to move from 
their "all-for-all" position_ General 
Ridgeway had prl'\'iously objected to 
his superiors in Washington on con-
durtin1! the prisoner poll, believing that 
one of his strongest points was that the 
prisoner's ehoice would he expressed 
at the exchange point in the presence 
of representatives of both sides and 
neutral observers.11 
Analysis of Motives. As we have 
categorized the negotiations, the initial 
phase terminated with the agreement 
to poll the prisoners. Drfore proccrc\-
ing to the next phase, the motives bc-
hind the actions taken to date by cach 
side should he examined_ On the U_S_ 
side four objectives can be considered: 
1. To obtain the speedy and com-
plete relcase of U.S_ prisoners in Com-
munist camps. 
2. To prevent a manpower advantage 
from accruinl! to the Communists. 
3. To a\'oid forring anti-Communist 
prisoners back into Communist con-
trol. 
4·. To achievc a psychological victory 
O\'er the Cllnnl1unists by iIIustrat in~ 
that a substantial numhrr of their 
soldirrs did not drsire to return til the 
Comlllunist Promised Lane\. 
The first ohjectivc was o\'erriding, 
and in order to achieve it HIC sccond 
ohjective had been abandoned early 
with the substitution of thc unenforce-
ahle parole feature for the initial "one-
for-one" position. In compromising 
on the one-for-one principle, howevrr. 
it became more difficult to achie\'e the 
third objcetive without forcing a loss 
of faee on thr Communisls and thrrchy 
rau~(' a IHlnll'ning IIf Il\I'ir po~itilln and 
a SUhSI'I\UI'nt faillll't, til ~ain tile' lir~1 
ohjel'tin" ,'rhill' Ihl' second ohjC'ctiw 
then was eompatihlr with the third. 
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huth wen' ill opposition tu IIIe' fir~l. 
The second objective the United States 
was willing to roncede, but not the 
third. Once puhlie opinion was mar-
shaled behind the principle of no 
forced repatriation, the UNC negotia-
tors' flexibility was lost. It is one thing 
to compromise to gain agreement; it 
is quite another to compromise on a 
humanitarian principle. 
At this stage of the negotiations the 
United States cannot be accused of 
merely atlempting to score a psycho-
logiral victory by demonstrating that 
many prisoners wcre not desirous of 
returning to the good life of a Com-
munist socicty. Thc prisoners had not 
heen polled to determine their views, 
anel whilc thc UNC may have suspected 
that many would not want to return, 
they did not know how many would 
refuse. It can only be concluded that 
the U.S. purpose was essentially hu-
manitarian. 
The objectives behind the Commu-
nist position are more difficult to deter-
mine, and we must, to a degree. specu-
late on their suhstanGe. Fir~t. til(' lIl0re 
than I 00.000 pri~olll'rs in" UNC ('amps 
rl'pn'sl'ntell a consillerable military as-
set that the Communists undoubtedly 
would have preferred to recover. Sec-
ond, the Comlllllllists prohahlr lll!-
lil'vl'd, anel not mistakenly, that any 
pri~olll'rs that wer(' not returned to 
tlwm would he reh'ased to serve Chian1! 
Kai-shck and Syngman Hhee. Third, 
the Communists may have suspected 
that many of their personnel would 
refuse rcpatriation. They knew full 
well that the Chinese soldiers were not 
\'oluntcrrs, that lllany of the Chincse 
prisoners were ex-soldiers of the Na-
tionalist armies and many of the Ko-
reans ex-soldicrs of the Army of South 
KorC'a. i\lass refusal to he rqmtriatrc\ 
"ollid ('un~lilul!' a llIajor ps~ I'holo~i(·:t1 
IIt'fl"al. 
All of the r('a~on" outlined ilbon' 
lllay han' plap'd a part in the dl'eision 
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of the COllllllllllis(:< to h!' ohstillalP (III 
til<' mailer of prisoncr exchan;!l'. What 
apppars e\'pn more likely, hOln'Yer. is 
that thp Comlllu:lists eOllsitien,d till' 
U.S. prisIlller5 in their hands to hc all 
asset ,,"hidl should not he pxpended 
prl'maturriy. A~rcement had not )'Pt 
hef'n rpached on other issU('s of tl}(~ 
armistice. Hefusing- to ag-ree on pris. 
oner repatriation, the Communists 1'1" 
tained har~aininf! power that they could 
apply to ~ain concessions on other is-
sues, not only in the Korean ne;!otia-
tions hut, if required, elsewhere in the 
cold lrar. The Comlllunists may hm'e 
looked to a future wl1(>n puhlir pa· 
tience within the United States and its 
allies would ;r1"01I' thin. The a~itation 
to stop the war, to 1"('('O\"('r prisllllers, 
('olllcl cause deeJl dissention within thc 
United States and hctween the United 
States and its 'allies. Unfellered hI' 
-- , 
any hUlllanitarian roncern for their 
Oil II personnel or for the prisoners they 
held, the COlllmunists refused to ~in' 
up their ~reall'st ne;;otiatin~ asset. 
Whatpn'r motin's lIlay ha\"(~ ;!uidl'd 
the partips in the ne!!otiations. mlll"h 
of the dis('ussioll lias characterized h~ 
lpp:al arp:ulllellts on the interpn'tatioll 
of the GpncI'<l Conl"Cntions of II) )I). 
Thc Communist side presented a "Iit('l"· 
alist" arp:unH'nt hased on tlH' (irst para-
!!raph of artide I III IIhich r!'ads. 
"Prisoners of war shall he rdeasl'd alld 
n~pat riat('d without delay after the ('('S-
sation of hustilities." They thell cited 
article 7 which statcs that, "Prisoners 
of war may in no circumstances re-
nounce in part or entirety the ri~hts 
secured to them hy the present Con-
vention ... " I:! 
Opposed to the literal interpretation 
of the Communists was the UNC inter-
pretation that in considering the con-
yention in its whole context there was 
nothin~ to l('ad one to heliel'e a pris-
oner of war mu,.:t hl' fnrcpd to rl'lurJI 
hOllle when that \I as 110t his de:<ir('. 
TIIP lINC maintained that the ('onn'n-
tion insurcd an opportunity to!!O It 0 III!' 
hut did not ne~alt' the right of a state 
to I!rant political a!'ylul1l to an incli-
vidual II"l1l'n it S(~"'(:ted to C\O so. The 
UNC r;olltenclecl that the spirit of the 
GOllYcntion, to protec:t the individual 
ri~hts of prisoners of war, clearly 
would be violated by forcible return. I:1 
The UNC was correct in that the 
drafters of the convention had not 
envisaged a detaining power having 
to usc force to return a prisoner of 
war to his homeland. Article 118 had 
heen wriuen under the assumption that 
the great majority would desire re-
patriation, so that the guarantee of this 
right was of primary importance. An 
amendment hy Austria had actually 
propo!<('d provisions for voluntary reo 
patriation but had been rejected on 
the grounds that such provision might 
be used to the detriment of the prisoner 
of war and allow undue coercion hy 
the detaining power.14 
The UNC argument, however, was 
not uniYersally convincing. After the 
conclusion of the armistice, Adlll. C. 
TUrllPr .loy. senior llNC dl'ie~ate, ex-
press('d I"('sel"\'ations, stilting that "the 
prin('ipln of voluntary repatriatioll was 
an arhitrary one, commanding no soli (I 
sUJlJlort in the Geneva Conventions ex· 
('cpt hy ullilat!'ral int!'rpn'tatioll of 
that ('OIl\"Cllant" and that tlte COIIIIIIII' 
nist illt('rpretation that the Geneva Con-
vcntion required the return of all pris. 
oners to the side of their origin was 
"a correct literal interpretation of that 
convenant." l!j 
Perhaps the arguments of the UNC 
would have found more widespread 
support if they had contained less lofty 
appeals to humanitarianism and morC' 
le~al substance. Article 118 calls for 
rcZease and repatriation. Forcible n'· 
patriation obviously would have reo 
quircd d<'t<'lItioll and repatriatioll 
throu!!h c'on\"l'yaIH'(' of t!J(' pri!'onl'r (If 
\I ar under !'onw :'ort of n':'traint tn tIll' 
anthllriti(':< of hi!' own ('ountry.1II 
TIll' apJleal of the Conlll1uni~ts to 
the Geneva Conventions was entirely 
cynical. Aclmi ral Libby had pointed 
out to them that ther themselves had 
already practiced voluntary repatria-
tion. They violated repeatedly other 
articles of the convention, such as the 
requirement of furnishing rosters of 
prisoners to the International Red 
Cross, allowing' inspection by that 
hody, and the proper marking of pris-
oner-oC-war camps - not to mention 
their maltreatment of prisoners, as 
was revealed later. 
III - KOREA: THE DEADLOCK 
The Polling of Prisoners. On 
8 April screening of prisoners of war 
commenced in the UNC camps. No 
effort was made by the UNC to in-
fluence prisoners to refuse repatriation. 
Quite the reverse was true. The UNC 
leaned over backwards to encourage 
prisoners to choose repatriation. At 
UNC insistence the Communist nego-
tiators had provided an amnesty state-
ment that was read to all prisoners 
prior to the screening.! The screening 
was completed on the 15th. The re-
sults were as shocking to the UNC as 
to the Communists. 
On 19 April the Communist negotia-
tor was inCormed that of the 170,000 
military and civilian prisoners in UNC 
hands, only about 70,000 would re-
turn to the Communists without the 
use of force: 7,200 civilian internees; 
3,800 South Koreans; 53,900 North 
Koreans; and 5,100 Chinese. What-
ever reason the Communists initially 
had for wanting an all-for-aIl exchange 
was now submerged in their need to 
overcome the psychological blow and 
propa~anda oeCeat causrd by over onl'-
half of tlll'ir pl'rslllllwl rl'fusin~ to rt'-
turn hOllle. TIl(' CunJlllunists felt tht')" 
had been d~liberately deceh'ed by be· 
ing furnished the U6,OOO figure only 
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to h,n-e it reduced to 70,OOOY They 
Celt they had been duped and led into 
a propa~an"tla trap. They had certainly 
fallen into a trap; hut the UNC, in its 
ignorance of the true extent of the 
prisoners' feelings, had not known it-
self of the trap's existence. 
The Package Proposal. The next 
move by the UNC, and one long in 
preparation in the event that the Com· 
munists did not accept the results of 
the prisoner poll, was to present a 
package proposal that the UNC hoped 
would resolve all outstanding issues. 
The three issues remaining were: 
1. Repatriation of prisoners of war. 
2. Whether the Communists were to 
he allowed to rehabilitate airfields in 
North Korea that had been destroyed 
by U.S. bombings. 
3. Whether the U.S.S.R. could serve 
as a member of the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission. 
The UNC proposal conceded the air-
fields issue in exchange for a conces-
sion on naming the U.S.S.R. to the 
commiSSIOn. The UNC position on 
"no forced repatriation" was substan-
tially unchanged, however. Admiral 
Joy presented this proposal in execu-
tive plenary session on 28 April. The 
Communists, still smarting Crom the 
results of the camp screening, rejected 
it, but the only unresolved issue now 
remaining was the repatriation of pris-
oners of war. The negotiations were 
in complete deadlock as the UNC had 
officially taken its "final and irrevoca-
ble position." 3 
War in the PW Camps. Com-
munist efforts now turned to a massive 
and worldwide propaganda campaign 
to discredit the screening of prisoners 
that hao rcsuheo in over half of their 
eaptnrt'd Jlt'n;olllll'l rdll~in~ to rl'lul'll 
to the COllllllunist side. In this dImt 
they exploited thoroughly the incred-
ibly bad administration and lack of 
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control in th!' pri~()n('r-()f-war ealllp~ 
of the U_N_ Command_ The U_N_ au-
thorities in charge of the camps did 
not know at the start of the negotia-
tions exactly how many prisoners they 
held, who they were, or what their 
desircs might he' toward repatriation_ 
In certain compounds they did not 
have internal control of the prisoners. 
such control having passed to Com-
munist organizers inside the fences. 
The camp authorities had simply failed 
to visualize that hard·core Communist 
prisoner p;roups would grow up inside 
the <'rowded cumps and that the leader-
ship of these groups could still receive 
instructions from and remain respon-
sive to the Communist command in 
North Korea:' 
As early us September 1951 violence 
had taken place in the camps, Commu-
nist leaders ha~'ing murdered 18 pris-
oners after trial hy a self-appointed 
"people's court." On 18 December 14 
prisoners died in riots as Communist 
and anti-Communist prisoner faetions 
fought to control the compounds. In 
Fehruary 1952 when U.S_ troops en-
tered a compound containing .').600 
Korean civilian internees in order to 
~creen out hard·core Communists the) 
were attacked by some 1,000 to 1,500 
prisoners. In the resulting fip;ht 77 
prisoners wcre killed, but the com-
pound was not screened. On ] 3 March 
Communist prisoners stoned their Ko-
rean guards_ Twelve prisoners were 
killed in the retaliation that ensued. 
During thc screening in early April, 
~e\"Cn compounds containing 37,000 
North Koreans refused to submit to 
screening. They were all counted as 
desiring repatriation_ The prime ex-
ample of Communist control within 
some of the compounds and its direc-
tion from North Korea in order to 
discredit the screeninp; process oc-
curred on 7 l\lay. On that date till' 
lJ.S. gcneral oilierr in l'onlllJanri at 
Koje Do was captured by the prison-
('\"~. 1\('ld insidl' tl\(' e(llllp(llInd for :~ 
days, and tried by a prisoner court. 
He was released after the new com-
mander signed what amounted to ad-
mission of U.S. brutality in carrying 
out the <creening. The Communists, 
of course. gave this unwilling admis-
sion worldwide puhlicity as well as 
demanding explanations at the negotiat-
ing table_ 
On ]0 June the UNC finally regained 
control of the Communist compounds. 
To do so required a ballle in whieh 
:n prisoners were killed (mall)' hy the 
COllllllunistg themgch-pg). In one com-
pound peaceably put under control, 
bodies of 16 prisoners murdered. by 
their fellow inmates were found." 
The disorders in the prisoner-of-war 
camps were exploited to the maximum 
by the Communists, not only at the 
negotiating table but by their world-
wide propaganda apparatus. Even in 
friendly countries such as Britain and 
Japan responsible persons were ex-
pressing opinions which indicated seri-
ous weakening of the international 
support that the UNC had been receiv-
ing on its screcning program and on 
the principle of voluntary repatriation. 
The Communists had purposely nnd 
effectively employed their personnel in 
the prison camps ag a propaganda 
\vl'apon ami negotiating ass(!t.u 
Despite the flat Communist rejection 
of the package proposal of 28 April 
and the constant stream of inver·th'e 
the UNC negotiators had to endure, 
screening of prisoners continued dur-
ing April and May. By June the last 
compound had been screened with 
83,071 prisoners requesting repatria-
tion and 86,867 stating they would 
resist it. It was almost a year aftrr 
the armistice negotiations had he~\In 
that the UNC negotiators had accura\(' 
data on which to base repatriation 
IlI'~otiationg_ 
Attempts to Bargain. In July 
the Communists indicated for a third 
time that they might be willing to 
compromise on their position. While 
considering in executive plenary ses-
sion the prisoner-of-war article of the 
draft armistice, the senior Communist 
delegate frankly told General Harri-
son, now UNC senior delegate, that the 
UNC must come up with a figure ap-
proximating 110,000 repatriates and 
that this figure must include all Chi-
nese prisoners.; General Harrison then 
released to them the 83,000 figure ob· 
tained in the latest screening. The 
Communists rejected the UNC list once 
again. The UNC had held firm to "no 
forced repatriation." 
On 23 September General Harrison 
proposed to the Communists three op· 
tions which it was hoped would save 
Communist face. All three choices re-
tained the prihciple of no forced re-
patriation and provided for transport-
ing nonrepatriates to a demilitarized 
zone. The options varied as to how 
further determination of the nonre-
patriates' status was to be made, such 
determination being either obsen'ed 
or conducted by combinations' of In-
ternational Red Cross and joint mili-
tan' commissions. On 8 October the 
CO~lmunists rejected this proposal, and 
the Iw~otiations recessed on the initia-
tive of the UNC.!! 
The recess of the negotiations closes 
our third phase of the negotiations. 
The allempt by the UNC to trade a 
concession on airfield rehabilitation 
for a concession on repatriation had 
failed. The Communist concessions 
had narrowed the controversy to Chi-
nese captives who did not desire to 
return to the volunteer army, but the 
deadlock seemed permanent. The UNC 
coulcl not alter its position without 
either renouncing a moral principle or 
admill iug that its screening pro!'l'ss 
was as {lishulll'st as the Communist 
propaganda claimed it to ht'. The Com-
munists, on the other hand, had suffered 
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11 psychological defeat before the world 
audience and a loss of face that they 
would not accept. 
When the UNC agreed to the Com-
munist suggestion that the prisoners 
be polled and when the results became 
known, both sides found themselves 
suddenly in a position from which only 
surrender rather than negotiation was 
possible. The objectives of both sides 
had, in the end, been determined by 
the sum of the individual desires of 
14,000 captured Chinese soldiers. 
Unilateral Release. Late in June 
the UNC began the release of 27,000 
Korean civilian internees. This was 
the first unilateral release of prisoners 
by the UNC, and even though they 
were classified as civilian internees 
rather than prisoners of war, the Com-
munists objected bitterly. They were 
informed that the release was an in-
ternal affair of the South Korean Gov-
ernment and the UNC negotiators reo 
fused to discuss it further.!! General 
Harrison suggested at this time that if 
the Communists failed to accept the 
revised screening figures (83,071 re-
patriates'), the UNC should unilaterally 
release the nonrepatriates, presenting 
the Communists with a fait accompli. 
Sneh a SdlClllC might have pel'lnilled 
the Communists to save face and 
thereby speed agreement. Harrison's 
superiors did not approve.10 
Actually, the idea of unilateral re-
lease of -nonrepatriates had been sug-
gested to General Ridgeway as early as 
Fehruary 1952 by Secretary of the 
Army Earl D. 10hnson and Vice Chief 
of Staff for the Army General 10hn E. 
Hull, during a visit to Tokyo. Ridge-
way had feared then that if the UNC 
followed such a plan it would not only 
o(1l'n ilself to charges of dl'ceit hut 
would ('llI!;\IIger Ih(· !iYl's of prisol\('rs 
in Communist hands. lI 
In October the lINC reclassified 
11,000 South Koreans from "prisoner 
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of war" to "civilian internee" and he-
gan to release them_ The Communist 
protests were again ignored_ Once 
again General Harrison suggested that 
if the Communists persisted in de-
manding forced repatriation, the UNC 
should release all the nonrepatriates. 
Gen. Mark W. Clark, the new U.N. 
Commander, like General Ridgeway 
before him, was not ready to accept 
this suggestion.12 
The General Assemhly Dehates. 
Until the breakdown of the talks in 
October 1952, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly had taken no part in 
the negotiations. Partly to counter 
Communist propaganda and partly to 
put the weight of the General Assembly 
behind the principle of no forced re-
patriation, the Secretary of State de-
li\'ered in the U.N. Political Committee 
a 3-hour review of the history of the 
Korean question. In his speech Dean 
Acheson pointed out that the U.S.S.R. 
had accepted the principle of voluntary 
repatriation in the Treaty of Brest-
Liton.k in 1918 and that twice during 
World War II the Russians had ofTered 
what amounted to \'oluntary n'pat ria-
tion to German soldiers at Stalingrad 
and Budapest. He also stated that the 
conflict oY(>r repatriation had hl'en 
"wholly unexpected" and "surprising" 
to the U.N. CommandP 
India took the initiative in ofTering 
on 17 Novemher a resolution to the 
General Assembly. This resolution, af-
ter discussion and amendment, ap-
pro\'ed repatriation of all prisoners of 
war following the signing of the armis-
tice. All prisoners of war would be 
turned over to a 'Neutral Nations Re-
patriation Commission in a demilitar-
ized zone. The Commission would 
make en'ry efTort to facilitate their 
return hut, "forre shall not 11(> uSC'cl 
a)!ainst prisoners of war to pn'\,('nt or 
efTect their return to their homelands." 
Each side would be free to explain to 
tl\(' prisone."!; tlll'ir ri~hts, and all pris-
oners who had not chosen repatriation 
after 90 days would be referred to the 
politiral conference proYided for in the 
armistice agreement. If this conference 
did not settle the nonrepatriates' fate 
within ;>,0 days, the prisoners would 
be turned o\,er to the United Nations 
for disposition,H 
The U.S.S.R. and the Communist 
hloc were adamant against the resolu-
tion. It was roundly denounced by 
SO\'iet Foreign Minister Vishinsky and 
Oil 28 NO\'ember flatly rejected by 
Chou EII-Iai. On 3 December a 
U.S.S.R. counterresolution calling for 
forcible repatriation was voted down 
and the Indian resolution adopted 54 
to 5, only the Communist bloc oppos· 
ing. 
While there was little chance of the 
Communists accepting the resolution, 
it did demonstrate to the Communists 
that world opinion as represented in 
the General Assembly was still on the 
side of voluntary repatriation despite 
the Communist propaganda and con-
triwd disorders in the prisoner-of-war 
camps. 
As till' Cenl'ral Ass(·mhly (·Oll('llllh·t! 
its ddmtes. the Presidcnt-eieet of till' 
United States. General Eis(>nhowl'l" 
II as \'isi t ing Korea. 1I is d(·(·larat ion 
at the end of his \'isit on G J)eceml)('r 
characterized as ill-founded any hope 
the Communists might have heltl that 
the incoming administration would ill' 
Il"iIIing to compromise on voluntary 
rcpatriationYi After the Republican 
administration took officc, the schemc 
of unilateral releasc of the nonrepa-
triates was once ap-ain recollllllcIUll·d. 
this time by Gcneral Clark. III Ewnt:;. 
howe\·cr, soon ovcrcame further di~· 
cllssion of the concept and its implc. 
mentation. 
1'h(> fOllrth pilasC' of the ncg(}tiatiun~ 
carried 11<1 ('hang(' in till' "asi,' \lu:;itiCln 
of each side. 1£ mcasured by fon'ill;! 
the UNC to compromise on the prill' 
ciple of no forced repatriation and hy 
persuading other nations to ahandon 
the lINC position, the COllllllunists' 
propa~anda campaign and its support-
ing disorders in the prisoner-of-war 
eamps had been a failure. The U.S. 
presidential election had been com-
pleted, and a new administration was 
in oflice. There was no indication, 
however, of a weakening of U.S. policy 
in the Far East. 
IV - KOREA: AGREEMENT 
The Key Concession. On 22 Feb· 
ruary 195:1 General Clark proposed 
to the CommunisLs an immediate ex-
change of all sick and wounded pris-
oners of war. The Communist reply of 
28 March agreed to the UNC proposal. 
Liaison officers met on 7 April, and 
on 9 April the exchange of sick and 
wounded prisoners of war was agreed 
upon. The exchange, dubbed "LiLLIe 
Switch," took place from 21 through 
26 April. On the UNC side 5,19·1 
Korealls, 1,030 Chinese, and 4-16 ciYi-
lian internees - a total of 6,670-
were returned to the Communists in 
exchange for 68·J. prisoners of war, in-
cluding 1·19 U.S. personnel. Each side 
had rdea:;ed approximately 5 percent 
of the prisoners it held. 
As gratifying as the exchange of 
sick and wounded prisoners was to 
the UNC, even more promlsmg was 
the hint of a break in the Communist 
position contained in their reply of 
23l\larch. In it the Communists stated 
"seulement of the question of exchang-
ing sick and injured persons on both 
sides during the period of hostilities 
should be made to lead to the smooth 
seLLlement of the entire question of 
prisoners of war . . . ." 1 This was 
fnllll\\('d h~ a statl'nlt'nl on :W i\lar("h 
by Chou En-Iai whi("h appeared 10 
contain the key concession. Chou stated 
that both sides, 
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o 0 • ~I\IIIII" !lAdertake III rcpatriaho illlo 
flIcdialtoly aft,or tl ... c:c:s~ation (If hostili-
li,o" all of thos" pri,CII"o"" of war in thc:ir 
cuslody 11'110 i1lo,io'/ IIpOIl repa/riatiOIl 
[italics added] and to hand over the re· 
flIaininl!: prisoners of war to a neutral 
"laIc ~o as to ensure a just solution to 
the 'Iuestiun of their repatriation." 
Negotiations Resume. While 
Chou's statement olTered much promise, 
Ihere were still many questions to be 
ans\\ ered and clari lied. lL was agreed 
to resume plenary sessions on the mat-
ter on 26 April. The long recess was 
at an end. Initial negotiations were 
based on a Communist proposal, and 
it quickly became evident that there 
were three major areas of disagree-
ment. Two concerned the explanations 
Ihat were to he made to the no moe-
patriates, where they were to he held 
and how long would he allowed for 
them. The CommunisLs wanted 6 
months in a neutral state, the UNC 
wanted 60 days in Korea. The third 
was Ihe selection of the neutral state. 
At this point General Harrison threat-
ened that if the talks broke down again, 
Ihe liNe would unilalerally release all 
prisoners who did not desire repatria-
tion.:! 
On 7 May a new Communist pro-
posal was tabled. In it the question of 
tran~porlin~ J\()J\!"!'patriates physic-ally 
out of Korea was conceded and a Neu-
tral Nations Repatriation Commission 
suggested. Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Switzerland, Sweden, and India were 
the proposed members of the commis-
sion; each was to furnish an equal 
number of armed personnel and to 
share in the task of maintaining cus-
tody of the nonrepatriates in their orig-
inal places of delention. This plan 
bore a close resemblance to that con-
tained in the General Assembly resolu-
tion and was hrlieved hy the UNC to 
pro\" ide' a hasis for III'1~Clt ia ling 1111 1lC'-
(°l'Jltahll' armistice. 
The U.S. Government desired that 
four conditions he added to the pro-
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posa!. Firsl, unanimily should Iw IIII' 
basis of business conducted hy the Re-
patrialion Commission_ Second, a time 
limit of ?,O days should he imposed 
upon the political conference for set-
tling the nonrepatriates' future_ Third, 
India alone should furnish all the 
armed forces and operating personnel. 
Finally, not more than 90 days could 
be allowed for the Communist explana-
tions to the nonrepatriates_ These four 
conditions were put to the Communists 
in a counterproposal on 13 May_ The 
conditions were not accepted_4 
On 25 May the UNC suhmitted a 
revised proposal. In it the UNC con-
tinued to insist that all armed forces 
and operating personnel he Indian. It 
also held out for a maximum of 90 
days for explanations. The unanimity 
issue was conceded; majority rule for 
the commission as desired by the Com-
munists was accepted. The UNC would 
agree either to tum disposition of the 
nonrepatriates over to a political con-
ference with a 30-day time limit and 
then release them, or alternatively let 
the U.N. General Assembly determine 
their disposition.5 
On .f. June the COllllllunists accepted 
the l.!NC conditions, and by 3 J lInc 
stafT officers of both sides agreed on 
the final delails of tlw terms of rder-
ence for handling prisoners of war. 
As the third anniversary of the start 
of hostilities and the second anniver-
sary of the start of negotiations ap-
proached, it appeared that an armistice 
was finally in sight. 
Syngman Rhee Ohjects. The 
UNC and the Communists had agreed, 
but the Government of South Korea 
led by the doughty Syngman Rhee was 
not yet to he reconciled. Rhee's ob-
jections to the armistice stemmed from 
his lifelong and ('ontinuing ohjI'd i\'(' 
of a free unifil'l] Korl'a, an ohjl'('\i\'(~ 
that the United Statcs and its U.N. 
allies had long since abandoned. As 
l'I~ga rds sp,'c'i fic'" (I y thc: a1-\I'I'c'/llI'nt on 
handling prisoners of war, RI1l'C in-
sisted that no Inclian troops would he 
allowed on the territory of the Repuhlic 
of Korea, that Communists explainers 
would not be allowed in his rear 
areas, and, finally, that no Korean 
prisoners would be turned over to 
troops of India, a nation Rhee consid-
ered as having Communist inclina-
tions." 
How far Rhee was willing to go to 
upset the approaching armistice could 
only be p.lIessed hy U.S. offic:'ials. On 
18 .June thei r fears were confirmed. 
Bctween midnight and dawn that clay, 
with the collusion of South Korean 
seeurity troops, approximately 25,000 
anti-Communist North Korean prison-
ers of war escaped. By the end of June 
only 8,600 Korean nonrepatriates re-
mained of the some 35,400 confined on 
17 June. Syngman Rhee had carried 
out what had heen practiced previously 
by the Communists and what had often 
been considered by U.S. officials: he 
had unilaterally released prisoners of 
war who did not desire to he rC'pa-
I ria I l'cl. While the UNC had ronsidl'red 
sueh a lllC'aSIlI'C as a possihle means of 
expediting an armistice, Rhee had used 
it as a means by which he hoped to 
forestall an armistice. 
The UNC was 1I0W faced with 11l'~O­
tiating on two fronts. There was the 
task of gelling Rhee's acceptance of 
the armistice alld the task of persuad-
in~ the Communists to continue nego-
tiations despite Rhee's release of pris-
oners. The first task was accomplished 
by Mr. Waller Robertson, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Af-
fairs, who in long conYel'sations with 
Rhee between 2.J. June and 11 July re-
affirmed once again that no anti-Com-
lllunist prisoners would be reluJ'Jlrd 
10 the COllllllunist sicle ancl won Hlll'l:'S 
I'oopl'ralion with tlw arlllistic','. 
Agreement and Repatriation. 
The task of continuing negotiations 
with the Communists proved less dif-
ficult than winning the reluctant co-
operation of Syngman Hhee. The 
negoti'atipns had been interrupted O!l 
20 June as' a result of the unilateral 
prisoner release, plenary sessions not 
resuming until 10 July. By 19 July 
the Communists indicated a willingness 
to go ahead with an armistice. A sup-
plementary agreement on prisoners of 
war was then completed, providing that 
alI nonrepatriated prisoners of war 
would be delivered to the Neutral Na-
tions Repatriation Commission in the 
demilitarized zone. Rhee's conditions 
of having neither Indian troops nor 
Communist explainers on South Ko-
rean soil were thus satisfied. The Ar-
mistice Agreement was signed by the 
respective commanders on 27 July 
1953. . 
On 23 September the UNC turned 
over more than 22,000 nonrepatriates 
to the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission. Of the 14·,701 Chinese 
nonrepatriates turned over, II-W elected 
to rl'turn to COlUmunist control, 12 
went to India with the custodial force, 
and 1.1·,235 returned to UNC control. 
Of the 7,900 Korean nonrepatriates, 
183 returned to the Communists, 7·1. 
went to Imlia, and 7,()() I. were relurned 
10 UNC control. By JI) Fehruary 1!J5 I. 
the ·Chinese under UNC conlrol had 
been moved to Taiwan and the Koreans 
released. In alI exchanges, including 
Ihose of Ihe sick and wounded in 
April, m,121 UNC-captured prisoners 
were rl'patriated, some 27,000 short of 
what Ihe Communists had indicated 
willingness to settle for in July of the 
previous year. 
The last phase of the prisoner of 
war negotiations was marked by Ihe 
complete ('apilulalion by the Commu-
nisls on the principle of nonforeihle 
r('palrialion. Whcn Choll En-Iai 1lI.\(It, 
his annClllllcellll'nt on :n i\Iarch I 1)5:~. 
there was, in essence, agreement thaI 
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no prisoner of war would be fon·ell 
to return to the side from which he 
was eapturell From Ihat dale it is 
apparent IIOW that the Communists de-
sired to end the Korean situation. The 
final agreement on the disposition of 
the nonrepatriates was not fundament-
ally difTerent from General Clark's pro-
posals to the Communists of 28 Sep-
temher 1~52 or from the General 
Assembly Resolution of 3 December 
1952. 
We can only speculate as to the 
motiYes behind Ihe Communist deci-
sion to con('ccle on the repatrialion is-
sue and conclude an armistice agree-
ment. The concession was, however, a 
significant item of the "peace ofTensive" 
that followed the death of Stalin on 5 
March 1953. The reasons behind this 
"peace ofTensive" were undoubtedly 
val"ied and may have been quite un-
related to tIte prisoner-of-war issue or 
even to the Korean situation.; The 
concession on repatriation at this time 
does demonstrate, nevertheless, that 
prisoners of war in Ihe Communist 
view are to be used to faeililatc politi-
cal maneuverings and to serve political 
objectives. 
v - LEGACY ANn LESSONS 
The Negotiations in Retrospect. 
A striking feature of these long negotia-
tions was that the only true negotiating, 
in the sense of give and take, occurred 
between December 1951 and April 
1952. Once the UNC had made its 
"final and irrevocable" offer, its prin-
ciple of voluntary repatriation was 1I0t 
negotiahle. From December unlil April 
the UNC had moved from a "one-for-
one" position to that of "no forced 
repatriation," and the Communists had 
Illoycd frolll "ali-for-aIl" to ali apparl'nt 
willillgnel<s 10 an·l'pt a ri~ure of l<llllll' 
116.000 repatriall'''';. Arter April 1%2 
the COllllllunist ofTer to accept volun-
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tar}, repatriatioll for South Koreans 
and the later offer to accept a figure of 
llO,OOO, if it included all Chinese, were 
both rejected by the UNC. The UNC 
efforts to have the Communists accept 
voluntary repatriation by cloaking it 
in various procedural arrangements at 
the transfer point were equally fruit· 
less. Only when the Communists con· 
ceded could the armistice be brought 
about. 
It should be recognized that the 
Communists ~howed more flexibility 
in th.ese negotiations than the UNC. 
Although they had themselves applied 
\'oluntary repatriation, they insisted 
in the beginning of negotiations upon 
the principle of complete repatriation. 
From this position they went to partial 
voluntary repatriation and finally 
agreed to the UNC principle. Prisoners 
of war apparently were to be used for 
wha,tewr advantage the Communists 
might gain from them under a particu-
lar set of circumstances. 
Voluntary Repatriation - A 
Legacy. The inflexibility of the U.N. 
position and the possibility of its hay-
ing heen a major cause of prolonging 
the Korean war gave rise to the ques-
tion whether e~tabli~hing the principle 
of voluntary n'patriation was worth-
whill!. Th(· long additional 1I10nths 
li.N. personnel had to endure in Com-
munist pri~on camps anclthe additional 
casualties suffered on the battlefield 
were indeed a high cost. Admiral Joy, 
writing after the armistice was con-
cluded. deserihed the cost as follows: 
'\'olllntary r('palrialion' plac('d Ihe 
welfare of ex·Commllni~t ~oldiC'r:; ahon' 
that of our own Unil('d Nations Com· 
mand persollll('1 in Communist prison 
camps, and abo,'C' Ihat of our Unil,'d 
Nalions Command "liII nn 1111' hall I,' 
\'nhllliary n'l'alri:tlinll I'n~1 II~ 1I\'('r :1 
n'ar nf \lar. :II1l1 .'n~1 nllr lllli,,'.! Na, 
iinns C"IlIlIl:\IHI pri~"I\('r" in Cnmmu-
ni,,1 .'amp~ a Yt'ar nf caplivilY, Th., 
lInilt'!1 Nalilln~ Command ~ufT.'n'd al 
!t'ast 50,000 casuulli!'s in IhC' eonlinuing 
Korean War while we argued to protect 
a Jf'sscr numher of ex·Communisl~ whn 
did not wish tn r!'lunt 10 Communism.' 
If it was thought that in the future 
Communist soldiers, recaIling the 
terms of the Korean armistice would 
desert in mass, then conflicts at the 
Bay of Pigs, on the India-China border, 
and in Vietnam have failed to bear out 
the theory. President Eisenhower, 
however, taking a longer view of the 
principle's influcnce on thc future, 
stated: 
The armistice in Korea [has] inaugu· 
rated a new principle of freedum-
that prisoners of war are entit\('d to 
ch(ln~e the side 10 which Ihl')' will he 
releasC'd. In its impact upon history, 
that one principle may weigh more than 
any hallIe of our time.' 
Whether insisting on voluntary reo 
patriation was correct or not at the 
time of Korea, we are already seeing 
its impact on the future. The United 
States and its allies in Korea sacrificed 
heayily to establish Ihis "new princi-
ple of freedom." Even if the sacrifice 
was a mistake in Korea, it cannot be 
cOlTecled now. In negotiations oVer 
the prisoners of war of Vietnam which 
Illay I)(~ 11l'11I in IIIl' fill lin', IIIl' "n('\\' 
principle of frecdolll" cannot he ahan· 
doned. Voluntary repatriation, for 
better or for worse, is Korea's legacy 
to Vietnam. 
Lessons from Korea. Though reo 
versal of our Korean position of volun-
tary repatriation is not a feasihle cor-
rective action to be applied to Vietnam 
ne~otiations, it does not mean that 
'there are no lessons to be deriyed from 
the Korean talks that have value for 
Vit'lnam .. Re\'iew of the Korean pris. 
()1It'r-of,wal' 1H'~olialiolls clisdost's, ill 
Ihi~ wrilt'r'~ opinion. six t'ITOI'~ 1II1111t' 
hy till' lilliit'd Slalt'~ Ihal lIIay h:!\'(! 
delayed the armistice and hence the 
repatriation of its captured personnel. 
They will he discussed below in the 
order in which they occurred. 
Mistake 1: Not insisting that 
prisoner.of.war matters be dis· 
cussed earlier in the armistice ne· 
gotiations. Discussions on the pris-
oner·of-war question did not begin 
until 5 months after the armistice talks 
started. The settling of important is-
sues prior to the prisoner-of-war ques-
tion heing di~cu~sed meant thaL the 
UNC negotiators had few remaining 
concessions to make that could be 
traded for Communist concessions on 
the prisoner.of-war issue. By the time 
the "package proposa]," tying the pris-
oner·of-war issue to other issues, was 
offered, the only suhstantive question 
yet unresolved was the rehabilitation 
of airfields in North Korea. This re-
sulted in the UNC negotiating for the 
return of its prisoners, about whom it 
cared deeply, while having little to con-
cede except Communist prisoners, 
about whom the Communists cared 
nothing. The lesson is that arrange-
ments for repatriation of pri~oners of 
war should be sellled (or preferahly, 
carried out) before the Communists 
have gained all the concessions they 
eon~ider vita] on other issues. If the 
Comlllunists refusc to a~rec on repa-
triation of prisoners of war, we must 
refuse to agree on a malleI' of im-
portance to them. 
Mistake 2: Introducing a politi. 
cal issue, voluntary repatriation, 
into negotiations for a military 
armistice. It would be naive to hope 
that a military armistice conference 
does not ha,'e political overtones and a 
political impact, or indeed that such 
a ron ference, like war itself, is not a 
jlOlitical art. Deliberately inserting the 
hi!!-hl~ political issue of vo1!llItary n'-
patriatinn into the prisonrr-of-war nr-
gotiations, however, was not in the in-
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terest of an early trun!. That the liNe 
purpose might have been entirely hu-
manitarian does not alter that conclu-
sion. When the political issue resulted 
in a psychological defeat for the Com-
munists, their greatest requirement 
became time. Time was needed to 
prove that the UNC was hrutalizing 
Communist prisoners into refusing re-
patriation, to allow the United States 
and its allies to grow weary of the 
issue, and to let the world forget the 
results of the screcning. It was almost 
a year after the poll hefore the Com-
munists fclt they could afTord a eon-
cession. Had the UNC continued to 
insist, as it did initially, on a purely 
military armistice, it could have mag-
nanimously ofTered to exchange a~ 
many as six prisoners for everyone 
received and never have had to bring 
up the voluntary repatriation issue. One 
cannot state with assurance that this 
would have brought about an earlier 
armistice, but it would have avoided 
the political issue and precluded what 
may have appeared to the Communists 
either as an obligation to spend months 
allempting to discredit the prisoner 
]lolling or an opportunity to dclay the 
negotiations. The lesson is that there 
is a legitimate basis for avoiding polit-
ea] i~~lles in a military 'armistice con-
fen!nt:c: it should he exploited when 
this is in our interest. 
Mistake 3: Not having accurnte 
information on the desires of pris. 
oners of war as to their repatria. 
tion. Had the UNC decided not to 
introduce the political issue of volun-
tary repatriation into the armistice 
talks, it could not, in fact, have offered 
a 2, 3, or 6 to 1 exchange because of 
its abysmal ignorance of the human 
'material it had in its camps. Its pris-
onC'r-of-wur ramps were operatC'd with 
tht' so]p intention of k('('pin~ nt'utra]i1.l'ti 
the confillcd manpower whilc comply-
ing with the obligations of the Geneva 
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Prisoner of War Convention. Only 
when it was decided to use this man· 
power in negotiations did the UNC dis-
cover the complications involved. 
Had the UNC negotiators realized 
the extent of anti· Communist feeling 
in the prisoner·of.war camps, they 
could have anticipated the Communist 
reaction to the results of a prisoner 
poll. The chain of events that would 
follow could have been predicted and 
therefore avoided. As it turned out, 
until the results of the prisoner screen· 
ing were learned in April 1952, the 
UNC had been negotiating in the dark, 
insisting upon voluntary repatriation 
when such insistence, unbeknownst to 
them, was leading inevitably to dead-
lock. The direct confrontation on thc 
principle of voluntary repatriation need 
not have occurred had the UNC known 
the facts. .j\dditionally, the round 
figure of 116,000 repatriates would not 
have been furnished and the subsequent 
Communist charge of bad faith 
avoided. The lesson from this mistake 
is to have accurate information on all 
factors \\"hich will influence the nep:otia-
tions before discu:::sion::, are startcd. 
Mistake 4: Conducting a uni-
lateral poll of prisoners. Once the 
Communists agreed to a poll of tlw 
prisoners, the UNC should not hayc 
conducted the poll unilaterally. If the 
results of a UNC.conducted poll turned 
out badly for the Communists, they 
could claim a fraudulent poll. If the 
poll were made by neutral or joint 
commissions, the Communists would 
have had a much more difficult time 
arguing fraud. General Ridp:eway's 
early reluctance to conduct the poll and 
recommendation that the chore be left 
to a neutral commission at the transfer 
point were well founded. Once the 
Communists learned of the extent of 
thc anti·Communist fc(,ling. th('y hat! 
no choil't' but to objt'l'I to a !'t'eo III I 
poll, cvcn one conductcd hy a neutral. 
If a joinl.or ncutral commiSSIOn, on 
the other hand, had made the original 
poll, and every Communist had ex-
pressed a desire to return to his home· 
land, it would have been considered 
quite normal. The lesson is that the 
UNC had much to gain by giving the 
poll an aura of legitimacy that was dif-
ficult to dispu teo 
Mistake 5: Utilizin~ as a propa-
gamla theme the refusal of Com-
munist prisoners to he repatriated. 
It is understandable, gil'en the intense 
competition of the cold war of the 
early 1950's, that any opportunity \\as 
seized to demonstrate disillusionment 
within the enemy camp. It is equally 
truc that with a frc(' and al!gr('::,si\'(~ 
press the United States is not alwap; 
able to present news in a restrained 
fashion. Nevertheless, treating the de-
fection of Communist prisoners as a 
major ideological victory was definitely 
not in the interest of an early armistice 
or an early repatriation or' American 
prisoners of war. If it had been under-
!'tood that such a propap:anda yidory 
was actually l'ounlt'rpnllhlt·tin' of tIll' 
{I.S. ohjecti\'e in Ko\'('a of ohtaining 
an honorable cease-fire, that objective 
might well have been reached earlier. 
\"\Ie were trying to stop the military 
pha!'l~ of the war, hut Wl'J'(~ !'till l'am· 
paigning vigorou!'l)' 011 the p!'ychologi-
cal fronL. The lesson, as Admiral Joy 
put it, is that "a military armistice 
conference is no place to seek a propa· 
ganda victory." 3 
Mistake 6: Failure to take 
greater advanta~e of the schemc 
of unilaterally releasing prisoners. 
On three separate occasions durin;,! 
the negotiations, large-scale releases of 
Korean prisoners were made without 
the agreclllent of the Communist ~icl('. 
TIll' Communi:.;t!', prior til tIte !'tart IIf 
thl' nq.!.otiation::'. hall hy tlll'ir lI\\'n 
atlllli~!'ion also made large.scalc re· 
leasrs. On at least four occasions uni-
lateral releasc was proposed by senior 
responsible U.S. officials. In each case 
concrrn that such action would jeopar-
dize the return of American prisoners 
was the principal reason for not going 
through with the scheme. While thc 
Communists objected vehemently on 
evcry occasion when the UNC released 
prisoners, therc is no indication that 
thc release either delayed the armistice 
or jeopardized the return of U.S. pris-
oners. 
The release of Korean prisoners 
woulcl hm'e been a relatively simple 
matter, as Syngman Rhee proved to 
everyone's dismay but his own. The 
Chinese prisoners were a different mat-
ter. Sending them to Taiwan may have 
been politically unpopular as Chiang 
had been driven from the mainland 
only 2 years before and was discredited 
in the eyes of much of the world. 
Ncvertheless, it was to Chiang that 
these people were eventually sent. If 
the prisoners who did not desire repa-
triation had been sent to Taiwan prior 
to the start of the negotiations, and 
their desire to go to Taiwan confirmed 
by neutral observers, there was nothing 
that the Communists could have done 
but accept the fait accompli. The les-
son from this mistake is that if volun-
tary repatriation is to be practiced, it 
should be done unilaterally and before 
negotiations have started. 
While perhaps not falling in the cate-
gory of negotiating "mistakes," there 
were other difficulties that the UNC 
encountered which are important to 
the understanding of the Korean pris-
oners·of-war negotiations. The first 
one, causing extreme embarrassment 
to the UNC negotiators, was the lack 
of firm control over the prisoner-of-
war camps. This was a basic reason 
for not knowing the desires of the 
prisollrrs of war on repatriation, and it 
would have complicated unilateral re-
leases and could have made a shambles 
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of an) joint or 1\('lItral polling of the 
prisoners. It also prcH'ided the means 
hy which the unilatcral screcning was 
di!'creditcd. 
A second difficulty was the lack of 
an agreed position with the Govern-
ment of thc Republic of Korea. That 
go\'crnmcnt did not ohject to the for-
mulation of prisoner-of-war arrange-
ments as much as it did to the armistice 
itself. Syngman Rhee's prisoner re-
leasc was not successful in prcvcnting 
the armistice, but if they had so dc-
sired it would have prO\'idcd an oppor-
tunity for furthrr stalling by the Com-
munists. 
Such appear to he the principal er-
rors made by the United States in the 
process of establishing the principlc of 
voluntary rcpatriation. To determine 
if the lessons learned in Korea have 
application to the negotiations over 
prisoners of war that might evolve in 
Vietnam, it is necessary to examine 
the current prisoner-of-war situation 
there. This is the object of the follow-
ing chapter. 
VI - VIETNAM: THE 
PRISONER OF WAR SITUATION 
Application of the Geneva Con-
vention. The 191.9 Gencva Conven-
tion, relative to the treatment of pris-
oners of war, is applicable to the 
Vietnamese conflict just as it was to 
the Korean. Article 2 states that, "the 
present Convention shall apply to all 
cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict [italics added] which 
may arise between two or more of the 
High Contracting Parties even if the 
state of war is not recognized by ope 
of them." The Republic of Vietnam 
(Saigon), the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (Hanoi), and the United 
States arc all signatories to the con-
vention. [Editor's note: In the unlikely 
event that the conflict in Vietnam is 
312 
determined to he "not of an i nil' I'll a-
tional character," Article 3 of the 
Geneva PW Convention would apply_! 
Problems generated in that situation 
are .beyond the scope of this paper_] 
Included in the catep;ories of cap-
tives who are to be considered as pris-
oners of war per article 4. are "memhers 
of the armed forces," which certainly 
includes the crewmen of U_S_ Air Force 
and Navy aircraft, and also "members 
. _ . of organized resistance movements" 
provided they fulfill the following con-
ditions: 
... that of b('ing ("ommamled hy a Jll'r-
son responsible for his subordinates: 
that of having a fix('d distinctive sign 
recognizable at a di~tance; that of 
carrying arms openly; that of condu!'t-
ing their oJll'rations in accordance with 
the laws and customs of war.' 
Few of the conditions of article 4 
are met by the Viet Cong guerrillas, 
particularly those pertaining to the re-
quirements to be readily identifiable 
as combatants. Nevertheless, in order 
to encourage reciprocal treatment of 
American and South Vietnamese cap-
tives, the United States and the Re-
public of Vietnam interpret article .'1 
liberally' and grant prisoner of war 
status to many captured guerrillas who 
do not qualify under a literal inter-
pretation of article ,t In general, the 
rights of prisoners of war are accorded 
to all captives captured under arms 
during the course of military opera-
tions.:! 
The United States! Repuhlic of 
Vietnam Program. As was true in 
Korea, the United States and its allies 
attempt to comply with the provisions 
of the convention despite the difficulties 
presented by an insurgency situation_ 
In June 1965 the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (lCRC) ad-
dressed letters to the Governments of 
the United States, the Republic of Viet-
nam and the Democratic Republic of 
Vielnam, and 10 Ihe National Lihera-
lion Front remindinp: each of their ob-
ligations under Ihe Prisoner of War 
Convenlion. In their replies the United 
Siaies ancl Ihe Hepuhlic of Vietnam 
both assured the rCRC that Lrealment 
of prisoners by their forces would be 
in full accord wiLh the convenLion.4 
This posiLion was reiterated at the Ho-
nolulu Conference of February 1966 
where "the leaders of the Lwo govern-
ments ... reaffirmed their determina-
tion . . . Lo adhere to the Geneva 
Conventions of 19·19 on the treatmenL 
of prisoners of war .... " r. To carry 
out this intent, a prisoner-of-war camp 
consLruction program was sLarLed in 
Vietnam_ The iniLial camp was com-
pleted aL Bien Hoa in the Spring of 
1966, the firsL prisoners being interned 
there in May of that year.6 
By agreement between the Com-
mander, U.S. Military Assistance Com-
mand, Vietnam (MACV) and the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-
nam, all prisoners of war taken by the 
U.S_ forces in South Vietnam are ulti-
mately transferred to the custody of 
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN). This procedure is allowed 
under article 12 of the convention. The 
United States does retain a contingent 
responsibility that those prisoners 
('aptured hy its forees arc accorded nil 
rights as prisoners of war_7 In meet-
ing this responsibility, MACV proce-
dures stipulate that American units 
will not turn over custody of prisoners 
of war except at an established pris-
oner-of-war camp. Evacuation up to 
that point remains entirely under the 
control of U.S_ forces. By September 
1967, in addition to the camp at Bien 
Hoa, camps were operating at Pleiku, 
Danang, Qui Nhon, Can Tho, and on 
the IIe de Phu Quoc off the south-
western coast of Vietnam. A U.S_ Army 
advisory detaehmcmt is present aL e:l('h 
of these ARVN-administered installa-
tions.s 
Tlw ICRe ha~ a~~unll'd till' humani-
tarian funelions of the "Protc<'Ijll~ 
PowC'r" under article 1 0 of the con-
vention. It periodically visits eamps, 
inspC"~tin~ conditions and inten-ie\\'in~ 
prisoners of its own choice without 
witnC'sl'es. Additionally, the JCRC 
visits hospitals wher£' si('k and wounded 
prisoners of war are confined as well 
as the temporary detention facilities 
operated by U.S_, AltVN, and allied 
forces. The ICRC has visited prisons 
and jails in South Vietnam where pris-
oners of war were located prior to 
construction of. the prisOll£'r-of-war 
camps.!) The press has visited the 
campsyl 
As Ihe freedom of access accorde-c1 
Ihe lr.RC indicah'~. U.S. fOlTC'S and Ihe 
Republic of Vietnam make C\'CIT efIort 
to comply with the spirit as weII as 
Ihe leller of Ihe· G£'neva Convention on 
Prisoners of War: despite an earlier and 
underslandable reluctance on the part 
of the Government of the Repuhlic of 
Vietnam to accord prisoner-of-war 
status to persons who, from its point 
of view. were ~uilty of treason. In 
the bailIe conditions in South Vietnam 
only Ihe uniformed soldie-rs of thc 
North Vietnamese Army are readil) 
identifiahle as havin~ the rip;ht of pris-
oner-of-war sial us. Whe-Iher olh£'r ('ap-
liv£'s arc e-ntitled to prisone-r-of-war 
status depends, to a lar~e degr£'e-, upon 
the ('ircumslances of their capturC'. UlI-
Iii proper status can he d£'termined, all 
captured persons are classified as "de-
tainees." Durinp; screeninp; and inter-
rogation a detainee is determined to 
he either a "prisoner of war," a "ci-
vilian defendant," or an "innocent 
ch·i1ian." The first catel!ory is interned 
in a prisoner-of-war camp, the second 
transferred to ch'j)'aulhorities for trial, 
and Ihe- third is relC'asl'cl. if possihle. 
al Ihl- point of appn-llI'nsioll. In douht-
ful ca,.£,,. till' tribunal IWIlI'I'dun- prl'-
scribt'll hy artieil- ;; of Ihe conwntion 
is appli£'d. 11 
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Anlllll~ till' COlllnlllni~t Jlri~lIlll'r~ of 
war. three I~ PI'S arc found: the North 
VietlHlIllC'sc solcli£'r, the South Viet-
IHlIlwse who moved to the Communist 
North after the Fre-nch-Viet Minh c£'ase-
lire (If I C)51· and latC'r was infiltrated 
back into the south to join the insur-
p:ent mO\'ement, 3nd the Viet Con~, 
\\ ho Illay he a Incal guerrilla or mem-
her of a main force unit but who has 
nen-r left South Vietnam. Each poses 
a different prohlem concerninp; his 
eventual rei case and repatriation. 
One further faelor, which thou~h not 
part of the tr(,<Itme-nt of prisnner~ of 
Wat· has a h£'arin~ on the repatriation 
problem, is the amnesty or Clzic/l Hoi 
("Opl'n Arms") pro~ram conductec) 
hy tht- Ht'lJllhlic' of Vil,tn:lm, \\hil'h as-
sures a Viet Conp: or North Vietnallle~e 
Army soldier who decides to return 
or defect to go\"(-rnmcnt control that 
he may do so without prejudice. Such 
persons are sent to special centers 
where they are instructed on the goals 
of the Saip:on govcrnment and are 
~iven training intended to equip them 
to lead constructive lives as citizens of 
the Republic. They are allow£'c1 to en-
lil't in the ARVN or return to a ch'ilian 
community, exempt from conscription 
into ARVN for 1 year. I :! 
Tlw COl1l1uUlliMt Attilu(I(~. The 
Hanoi government has taken a very 
different altitude towanl captured per-
sons than have its adversaries. Al-
though a signatory nation to the 19·19 
Geneva Convention since 1957, it has 
informed the ICRC that in its "iew 
the Prisoner of War Convention is not 
applicable due to the lack of a declara-
tion of war. It therefore considers 
captured American airmen to be "ma-
jor criminals," not prisoners of war 
who come- within the scope of the 
II> II) C('IIl-\'a a~n'e-nll-III.I:l Althoup.h 
Ilanni prnft's~I'S that the pri:<olh'r~ ill 
ils hands are treated humanely, il has 
denied representatives of the ICRC ac-
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(,l'~~ 10 Norlh Vil'lnalll. "arlil,tlladr 
di~t'()lIra~ing is Hanoi's refusal to pro-
yide rosters" of prisoners and the lack 
of a regular mail sen·ice. Hanoi, in 
elTeet, is holding these prisoners in-
communicado, and the U.S. aUlhorities 
will not know with certainty how many 
prisoners are being held and who they 
are. 
On 6 July 1966 captured American 
airmen were paraded throll~h the 
streets of Hanoi, and the North Viet-
nmnese announced that they \l"OlIld he 
tried as war criminals. This action 
set ofT a wave of protest which in-
cluded an appeal from 18 "do\'ish" 
U.S. Senators, a request from the Secre-
tary General of the United Nalions for 
Hanoi to "exercise restraint." and an 
appeal from Pope Paul reqlle~lil1~ 
Ireatment of prisoners "aceordil1~ 10 
internalional norms."].1 Realizill~ per-
haps Ihat Ire hac! gone too far, thai 
carrying through with a trial would 
more likely alienate world opinion to-
ward his re,gime than win sympathy for 
it, and would tend to unify Ihe people 
of the Uniled Slal!'s. setlin~ 01T \\"ithin 
the United States a demand for reprisal 
(a ]lossihility the Scnator warned 
against). ITo Chi l\Iinh annollnGf'<1 on 
27 .luly ]966 that an I I-memhcr com-
mission had h!'en pstahlish("c! 10 ill-
Yestip:ale U.S. war crimes Imt that IIIl 
trials were "in "iew." 1;; Hanoi has not 
yet seen fit to r("cognize Ihe applica-
hilil)' of thc Gencva Convention, ho\\-
ever, or 10 implemcnt fully its pro-
\'i5ions. 
The National Liheralion Fronl in 
Soulh Vielnam has adopled an allilu<ic 
similar to Ihat of Ihe GOYernmcnt of 
Norlh Vielnam. The Front ass!'rl;; Ihat 
it is not hound hy Ihe convention. he" 
eause it was not a party to the ct(·lihera-
tions Ihal hroughl it aholli. II does 
1101 I'onsicler Ihal any of Ihe nlpl ivl's 
it holels m"(' pri~onl'rs of \\olr.'" 'I'll!' 
Viel COII~ han' ewn puhlid~ an-
noun('ectlhe execulion in ]()OS of thrc!' 
('aplut"t'd ll.S. soldi,'rs as a n'Jlri~al for 
lit(' execution of Viet Con~ 1('(TorisIH 
hy the authorities of the Sai~on re-
{!ime.1i" The Viel Cong have furni~lJ('d 
no informalion on the idenlity, loea-
lion, or numher of prisoners II;at Ihey 
hold. Vict Cong confinement areas 
on~rrun hy U.S. forces are grim lesli-
monials of starvation conditions anci 
of prisoners hein~ murdered en mas~c 
hefore Iheir guards fled. III 
Repatriations to Date. Th!' Ge· 
neva Convention provides for I'(·palri". 
lion of prisoners of war durin:.t ho~tili. 
lies, and Ihe Unitect States ha~ 
repeatedly allempled through varioll~ 
channels to eflect sueh exchanges. On 
8 Drcemher ]C)oo Ihe JeRe annolll\('(,11 
Ihat Norlh Vietnam had rejct:ll'cl a pr\l· 
posal hy President Johnson for a ("Oil' 
ferenc:c undcr Heel Cross atl~pjcc~~ 10 
Gow;ider Ihe possibility of rcleasill{! or 
exchanging prisoners held hy holh 
sides.1l1 In August 1967 the U.S. Ill" 
parlmenL of State summarized its efT()rl~ 
10 arrange a prisoner of war exehall;!1' 
as follows: 
\'i'1' han' ('olltartc·d hnth Nnrth Vic,tnmn 
allll tIl<" Natillnal 1.i1l1'ration «'rullt. ,Ii· 
r<"("tly mill through illtc·l"ml'(liaric' •• ttl 
prlll'ogp digcug~ion~ of rc'patriatillll, ('~. 
.. han:!" or 11th"," malt .. ",; 1"'rtilll"llt til 
pri"'lln"r~ of war. On .J Illy 20, 11)(,(, 
Prc~idl'lIt Johllson publicly "l'rJ:"",,,1 
our willinp;negg to meet with Hanlli I!"'"' 
ernnJ('nt on tll<"~(' mailers at a ("lIlf"n'Il"" 
tahl,' und .. r ~pongor~hifl of tIll" 11111'1"' 
national Red Crlls,; Committcl', '1'1 ... In· 
ternational Red CroSg, national H",I 
Crogs societies, p;overnm"nts mill pri' 
yatc ppr~on. have appralpd to ilitll th 
Viet lIam and the National Lilwmtillll 
Front to diseugs these matlt'r~. I,"t 
e,"pry initiatin' has been r.-jcl"ll"l. Utltl! 
North Vil'tnam and thl' Vic,t CtllIl! I"· 
fusl' to ('omply with thc~,~ \'itul PIII\j. 
sin liS of the G .. nm'a Con\'l"ntilln. :111,1 
hoth rl"flls,' to (lisCIISS th" lIIult"r ,Ii· 
r .. ,:tly IIr thrull:!h auy intc'rlll,'di:II~'"'' 
Despite lhe failure of 1111" l'lIih,,1 
States to arrange prisoner.of-war r\· 
change or repatriation on a large 
scale, there have heen a numher of 
in!'lan('c!' of prisoner release, The 
United States has hoped to start a chain 
reaction of informal umlegotiated re-
leases, Between January 1966 and 
Augu!'t 1967 over 100 North Vietnam-
ese prisoners of war were repatriated 
to Norlh Vietnam at the demilitarized 
zone astride the 17th parallel. These 
personnel were accepted by the Hanoi 
re~ime, not as returned prisoners of 
war, hut as r.efugees from the south, 
Two wounded Norlh Vietnamese sailors 
caplurcd in an allack hy North Viet-
namese motor torpedo hoats on U_S_ 
Fleet unils in the Tonkin Gulf were 
repatrialed to Norlh Vietnam in June 
] 967 throu~h Camhodia, a~ain in hopes 
Ihat Norlh Vielnam would reciprocale. 
Additionally, in South Vielnam Ihe 
Gnvernment hm: released ?,.\. Viet Con~ 
prisoners of war during the period 
January 1966 Ihrouf!h Aup;ust 1967.21 
As of 1 Fehruary ] f)(iS the Viet Can;! 
have released nine Ameriean military 
prisoncrs. A r('lea!'e of three Ameri-
can soldiers in Cambodia in NO\'emhcr 
1967 revealed a new technique hy Ihe 
Conllllllnisl!': Ihe men were turned o\'er 
to a \'Cprcsentath'e of an American 
anlill'ar ;!roup: aceonlin;! 10 Ihc Na-
lional Lihcralion Front reprcsenlatin' 
at Ihe !'C'cne, in rcspon!'e to "the United 
Stales llIo\'emcnt of opposition to 
Ameriran im'oh'cment in the Vietnam 
war.":!2 The sin;!le release that has 
heen carried out hy the Hanoi re~ime 
lI'a!' C[uite similar. Thrcc capli\'e Amer-
iran pilOls in company \\'ith Iwo rep· 
resenlalives of an American peal'e 
!!rOllp were flown from Hanoi 10 V{('n-
tianC', Laos, and released on 16 F('h-
ruary 1963. Hanoi !'talC'd that the re· 
lea!'~ lI'as '\'ivid proof of Ihc l('nicnl 
and hUlllanilarian policy of Ill<' ])(,1110' 
('rali(' 111'1'1I1,lil' of Vil'llIalll III':-:(lill' tIll' 
f;\('1 Ihal IIII' linilt'd ~Ialt':-: ~o\'t'rnllll'lIl 
i:, 1'(Il1linuill;! il:' a~;!rC':,:,in' \\ar in 
SOlllh Vil'lllalil and illl('n!'ifyin;! ils 
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homhinp; of the \kllloeratic Repuhlic. 
of Vielnam." The lTanoi reprcscnta-
li\'t~ al!'o asked Ihal Ihe two Anwril'an 
antill'ar advocatcs "convey our wishes 
for still greater successes to the move-
ment of the American people against 
the U.S. war in Vietnam.":!:l 
COlllmunist Motivcs toward 
P.'isoncrs of War, The hehavior of 
the Hanoi regime and the National 
Liheration Front regarding the pris-
onl'rs-of-war question is fully consistent 
wilh Ihe image of the conflict in Viet-
nam Ihe Communists desire to present 
to Ihe world. The refusal of Hanoi to 
acknowled~e returned prisoners as 
memhers of the Army of North Viet-
nam support!' iL<; contention that no 
Norlh Vielnamese Army units are oper-
ating south of the ] 7th parallel and 
Ihat the conOie! there is a strug~le of 
the southerners against an oppressive 
r('p;ime. The "war criminal" allegation 
a!minsl captured U.S. airmen is con-
si!'lC'nl wilh the charp;e Ihat Ihe U.S. air 
allaeks a;rain!'t North Vielnam con-
::olilule 1II1\)l'o\'ok('d a!!p;ression and arc. 
III a lar~e de~!l"ee, directed against non-
mililary tarp;ets. The access given the 
forci~1I press (ancl cerlain memhers of 
Ihe American pre!'!' Ihat mip;hl ]l(~ 
:-:~ nll'allll'li(') 10 individual I'ri!'oIH'r:-: 
leads onc to helie\'e that the Ilalloi re-
~ime desires to present itself to the 
world as' humanitarian and generous 
despite the gravity of the "crimes" of 
the airmen.24 
The release of three enlisted soldiers 
hy Ihe Viet Con~ and three ofiicers by 
Ihe Hanoi re;rime to representatives of 
Amcrican peacc groups appears de-
si;rned to encourage such groups, aid 
them in p;aining support among the 
Amcriean p('oplc, and therehy divide 
fmlht'r Ihe U.s. pulllie opinion a!' 10 
1111' Vil'llI:l1II ill\'o,,"I'1I1I'1I1. If lIlt' pur-
1'0"1' of IIII' COlllnllllli:-:l:-: ha:-: also IWt'1I 
III ('hoo:'I' for relurn 10 1111' United 
Slale!' pC'rsonncl who would he eOIl-
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yinced of the correctness of the COIll-
munist cause and would espouse that 
cause publicly, Lhey have not been suc-
cessfuL In each case, afLer an iniLial 
flair' of press interest, the repatriaLes 
have slipped quieLly from public view_!!~ 
The CommunisLs in VieLnam, j usL as 
the CommunisLs in Korea before them, 
view prisoners of war, both their own 
personnel and those they hold, as Lools 
of psychological and political warfare. 
The prisoners they hold will be mis-
treated, well treaLed, or released de-
pending upon the political purpose to 
he ser\'ecL Their OWII personnel in 
anti-CommunisL hands are being 
ignored currently by both Hanoi and 
the National LiberaLion Front. If it 
were in the Communist political in-
terest, however, repetitions of disLurb-
ances such as were experienced on 
Koje Do Could 'well be attempted in 
order to manuever the camp authorities 
to tuke suppressiye measures. \Vere 
negotiaLions undertaken, the Commu-
nists could profess a soliciLous concern 
fOl'- their people that Lhey have not in-
dicated to daLe. 
VII - NEGOTIATING WITH 
COMMUNISTS 
Having analyzed the Korean negoLia-
tions and having examined the pris-
oner-of-war situation in VieLnam, there 
remains the final task of relaLing the 
one to the other_ By so doing, certain 
factors can he isolated that will in-
fluence the Vietnam negotiaLions as 
they did those in Korea. Recommenda-
tions can he made that will assist in 
avoiding the errors and difficulties that 
hampered us in Korea and that, hope-
fully, will expediLe the repatriation of 
Amerkan prisollers of war. 
1IlnlU'I1('('~ on Nt'~()li:lli()lls. That 
the COllllllunists in Vietnam refuse to 
reeognize the Gene\'a Convention on 
pri"oJl('rs-!if war :t.~ al'pli(·ahl(· to tlw 
situation does, ill their view, relieve 
them of the ohli~ation to repatriate 
the sick and wounded prisoners dming, 
and all of them aL the close of, hostili-
ties. Nevertheless, there have been more 
releases during the hostiliLic.c; in ViI,t-
nam than Lhere were in Korea, where 
the Communists did acknow1eclgc the 
applicahility of the convention. I f the 
Communists in Vietnam continue not 
Lo recognize the convention, it is clim-
cult to see how they can delay negotia-
tions through nonacceptanee of our in-
(('rpn·tat ions of its pr()visiorll~. Tlw 
Iwgotiations should therefore revolve 
more closely around the real issues in-
stead of being macle to appear as dis-
cussions of legal interpretation. 
Similarly, the Hanoi regime's pre-
tense that there are no North Vietnam-
ese Army .uniLs in South Vietnam, 
hence, no North Vietnamese prisoners 
of war, should result in their c1eelinin~ 
to ewn discuss the problem of \'olun-
tary repatriation. Hanoi can hardly 
demand the return of persons whose 
existcnce it denies. Whethcr or 110t 
h~ d('~jgn, I blloj. Jws m·oidl·d )l1:ll'il1~ 
it"l'lf ill a position wh('J"e it ('ould lin 
emharras!<ed, as were the Comlllllllists 
in Korea, hy the dl'fl'('tion of its PI'I" 
''0 II nI'l. On the othl'l' hand, llanlli's 
il1si!<tcl1ec that it is noL im'olved in 
Soulh Vietnam will necessitate negotiat-
ing wilh two parLies and therefore our 
making a double set of concessions in 
order to obLain the return of all pris. 
oners of war. 
In Korca the United SLates 110L only 
represenLed the Uniled NaLions hut was 
ahle to marshal through the General 
Assemhly worldwide nOll-Colllmunist 
support ~f its position. The U.S. posi. 
tion in Vietnam hardly enjoys sllch 
supporL, Loday. Sympathy for the Virt 
C()II~ :llltl for Hanoi, hOWI'''I'I', is <11'-
)ll'lIdt'nt upon tlwir lll'ill~ ahlt~ ttl ('tlll' 
tinue to condnce sympathizers that 
they are the aggrie\'ed parties and vic-
Iilus of Aml'rican aggression who only 
desire to be left alone to settle their 
problems. Mistreatment of American 
prisoners of war or recalcitrance in 
releasing them would he counterpro-
ductive to the external image they are 
attempting to portray. This is particu-
larly true of the influence of such be-
havior upon the image they are trying 
to project within the United States it-
self. 
The repatriation of prisoners of war 
in Korea was eventually elIected 
Ihrough the use of the Neutral Nations 
Hepatriation Commission. It will be 
more difficult for the United States to 
find parties that would represent its 
view ~n such a commission today and 
stilI be acceptable to the Communists. 
There is, however, hetter contact be-
tween Washington and Hanoi today 
than there ever was between Washing-
ton and the North Koreans and the 
Communist Chinese. The fact that an 
American citizen can go to Harioi and 
participate in a prisoner release without 
being entirely discredited in his home-
land is indicative of this contact. 
Voluntary Repatriation versus 
Code of Conduct. AILhough, as has 
been pointed out, the issue of voluntary 
repatriation may never he raiscd, it 
cannot he discounted. The flexibility 
of the Communist position in Korea 
must be remembered. If the principle 
of voluntary repatriation must be re-
negotiated in Vietnam, it wiII set up 
a definite connict for the United States 
with that other legacy of Korea, the 
Code of Conduct. The United States 
is comll1illed to both yoluntary· repatri-
ation and the Code of Conduct. To 
abandon the principle of voluntary re-
patriation would be to hreak faith with 
those Americans who sulIered and died 
to estahlish it in 11)52-5:t To fail to 
meet it~ ohli~ations unlier Ihe' Code 
of Conduct to its llIen now in Viet 
Con~ or Norlh Vietnamese prison 
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('amJl~ would be an equally sorry 
breach of faith. The best approach for 
the United States is to avoid heing 
placed in a position where voluntary 
repatriation can become an issue. 
Avoiding such a position can best 
be achieved hy not holding in prisoner-
of-war camps any personnel who do 
not desire to he repatriated. The Chieu 
Hoi program represents the first step 
in achieving this goal, for it provides a 
means for screening out anti-Commu-
nists and disillusioned rebels before 
they are categorized as prisoners of 
war. Since these returnees are pro-
vided treatment superior to that they 
would receive in the prisoner-of-war 
camps, there is no ohjection from the 
lel{C. Since they are, in elIcct, seek-
ing political asylum, which any sover-
eign nation has the right to grant at 
its discretion, the procedure is fully 
in accord with the norms of inter-
national law. This same right to grant 
political asylum can be applied to pris-
oners of war, thereby remoying from 
the prisoner-of-war camps on a con-
tinuinp: basis those prisoners who 
would hayc to be forced to go back 
to Communist controJ.1 
To avoid renegotiating the principle 
of volnntary repalrialion obviously re-
!Jllin's a d"plh of ('ontml and I'IJi"il'n('Y 
in the administration of the prisoner-
of-war program that was lacking in 
Korea. The political orientation (or 
lack of orientation) of the prisoners 
must be known, and the prisoners must 
be free of coercion from other prisoners 
of any political persuasion. lVlore ba-
sically, what is required is prior plan-
ning for the negotiations. 
Preparation for Negotiations. 
The lack of an agreed position on pris-
oner repatriation and lack of prepara-
lion for th()~(' 1H'p:olialion~. !loth al the 
p()il\t~ of d"ri:;ion and at the len'l nl 
\1 hi('h camp administration policy was 
('~tablished. worked to the serious detri-
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llIellt of (lur 1J('~otiators throu;!hout tIll' 
Korean armistice talks. Hoperull)' the 
al'l'ointml'nt of Amhassador at Larl!,c 
W. I\H~rd! Harriman to provide gen-
era! supervision of all Department of 
State aelions (:olll'ernin~ prisonC'J's held 
hy hoth sides and the formation of a 
Department of Defense Commillee Oil 
Prisoner of War Policy chaired hy the 
Assistant Serretary of Dcfem;e (Inter-
national Se(:urity Allain,) will provide 
the Goor<lillated hi;!h.levc! direelion 
and emphasis that is required.:! The 
construction of prisoner-of-war camps 
with adequate php'ieal facilities and 
the close coordination established with 
the representatives of the ICRC in 
South Vietnam should prevent some 
of the difficulties which were apparent 
in the Korean situation. 
In plannin~ for negotiations we 
must keep in mind how extremely im-
portant in Korea was the order in 
which agenda items were addressed. 
\Ve must insist on early selllell1ent of 
prisoner-of-war repatriation if \ other 
items are also heing 11egotiated. Our 
nel!"otiators must make unequi\'o('ahly 
dear to the other sielt' that the United 
Statf's will not consider any agenda 
item sell led until the repatriation of 
prisoners of war has Iwen agreed upon. 
If the COlllmunists are made to under-
stand that whate\'er ohjecti\'e they 
hoped to gain by entering into negotia-
tions cannot be gained with early a~ree· 
ment to release prisoners of war, we 
can disabuse them of the notion that 
by retaining prisoners of war they can, 
as in Korea, exact concession after 
concession from our side. Our Gov-
ernment olres it to our captured ]ler-
sonnel to make their release an agenda 
item of the highest priority. 
Holding prisoners of war is of in-
terest to tIl(' COJllmunists only as a 
nl'gotiating le\'l'r on otht'r issut's. Earl~ 
rt'pat riat ion hy itst'lf is a ('OIJ('I'SSiOIl 
they ran JIlake without damai!:e. \Ve 
sha'uld not conclud'e, howe\,er, tlIat they 
II ill rt'lt'ast' 0111' prisoners \I ithollt lIIak-
in;.\' liS pay for thl'lll. Korl'a indil'ates 
ot\wrwisl'. \VI~ llIust hI' prepnrl'eI to 
make I:OIII'I'Ssions in retllrn and not 
eX[led that a 1111're exchange of 0111' 
pl'isoncrs for theirs will rcsult ill fruit-
ful ncgotiations. We must sellle the 
prisoner-of-war issue while we still have 
sOll1cthin~ to concede that, while not 
vital to us, is of importance to thc 
other sidt'o 
Avoidjn~ Propa~m1(li7.in~. As 
was seell in the Korean analysis. the 
propap;antla victol') the UNC anti tIll' 
United States achieved may \I'e11 have 
been a major contributing factor to 
the lonp; delay in reaehing an armistice. 
The lastinp; ellcct or benefit to the 
United States of this propap;anda vic-
tory has heen negligible. To regain 
our captiye personnel we should avoid 
embarrassing the other side no matter 
how tempting the opportunity may 
sccm. I f repatria~ion in increments 
hegins, we should not propagandize 
about the condition of the personnel 
returned or allow puhliratinn of n'-
turnees' aecounts of conditions within 
the prisoner-of-war camps. To attempt 
to disfigure at that time the image the 
Communists have attempted to build 
of humanity and generosity would not 
be in th~ interest of early repatria-
tion. 
Coordination with the Repuhlic 
of Vietnam. The faet that all pris-
oners of war in South Vietnam are in 
the custody of ARVN could calise com-
plications that must be anticipated. lL 
is proper to assume that the regime in 
Saigon, as was 'thc regime in Seoul, 
will he against any cOllcessions to the 
Communists that would either weaken 
their position or infrin~e upon thpir 
sovereignty. We should expect them 
to be understandably suspect of any 
hilateral United States-Communist 
ne~olialion~. They will bclie\'c that in 
order to get back our prisoner~ of war, 
somethin~ that bclonr:s to us, we will 
bargain away- somethin~ that h~lon~s 
to the Republic of Vietnam. We should, 
of course, make every effort to estah-
lish fully mutual confidence and under-
standing and allempt to bring them to 
our point of \'iC\\". Such thin1!~ a~ the 
homhin1! of North Virtnam. a hloekadr 
of North Vietnam (if ~ueh i~ l'~tah· 
li~hrd prior to IIrr:nt iat ions I, anel re'-
po~itionin~ of American tro()P~ in 
South Vietnam do helclIlp; to us, hnw-
(wer,- and can hI! c'IIIH'Plled if n('I'I'~~ary 
without infrin~inl! upon thc 50Yer-
ei~nt) of the HC'pllhlic' of Vietnam. We 
c'annot nllow the ~lIlIth Vil,tmlll\(,~(' In 
u~(' their c:u~tody of Amcric:an-capturrd 
prisoner!; as a Icn>r against us, rceluc-
ing our flexihility in negotiations with 
the Communists. 
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Conclusion. On any occasion when 
the Uni~ed Statc~ ner:otiates with the 
Communists it su/Tcrs from one funda-
mental di~advantar:e: the United Siaies 
mu~t consider indi\'idual ri~hts and hu-
man dignity. The Communists con-
sidcr only the power position resulting 
from the outcome of the negotiations. 
This funoamental disadvantage i~ par-
lieu larly se\'ere in prisonrr-o f -wa r 
ncg<!tiations, wherc the 'ohject of thc 
negotiations is the individual. The Com-
munists in Vietnam have demonstrated 
that they consider prisoners of war legiti-
mate pawns of political warfare. They do 
not vary from the Communists in Korea 
in this consideration. The basic lesson 
from Korea is clear: To the Communist 
the prisoner of war is a hsstage. If you are 
not prepared to liberate him by force, 
you must be prepared to ransom him at 
some political cost. 
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